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#### 1NC A – Interpretation:

#### Topical affirmatives must affirm the resolution through instrumental defense of action by the United States Federal Government.

#### B – Definitions

#### Should denotes an expectation of enacting a plan

#### American Heritage Dictionary 2000 (Dictionary.com)

should. The will to do something or have something take place: I shall go out if I feel like it.

#### Federal government is the central government in Washington DC

Encarta Online 2005,

http://encarta.msn.com/encyclopedia\_1741500781\_6/United\_States\_(Government).html#howtocite

United States (Government), the combination of federal, state, and local laws, bodies, and agencies that is responsible for carrying out the operations of the United States. The federal government of the United States is centered in [Washington, D.C.](http://encarta.msn.com/encyclopedia_761576320/Washington_D_C.html)

#### Resolved implies a policy

Louisiana House 3-8-2005, <http://house.louisiana.gov/house-glossary.htm>

Resolution A legislative instrument that generally is used for making declarations, stating policies, and making decisions where some other form is not required. A bill includes the constitutionally required enacting clause; a resolution uses the term "resolved". Not subject to a time limit for introduction nor to governor's veto. ( Const. Art. III, §17(B) and House Rules 8.11 , 13.1 , 6.8 , and 7.4)

#### C – Vote neg –

#### First is Decisionmaking

#### The primary purpose of debate should be to improve our skills as decision-makers. We are all individual policy-makers who make choices every day that affect us and those around us. We have an obligation to the people affected by our decisions to use debate as a method for honing these critical thinking and information processing abilities.

Austin J. Freeley and David L. Steinberg – John Carroll University / U Miami – 2009, Argumentation and Debate: Critical Thinking for Reasoned Decision Making, p. 1-4, googlebooks

After several days of intense debate, first the United States House of Representatives and then the U.S. Senate voted to authorize President George W. Bush to attack Iraq if Saddam Hussein refused to give up weapons of mass destruction as required by United Nations's resolutions. Debate about a possible military\* action against Iraq continued in various governmental bodies and in the public for six months, until President Bush ordered an attack on Baghdad, beginning Operation Iraqi Freedom, the military campaign against the Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussein. He did so despite the unwillingness of the U.N. Security Council to support the military action, and in the face of significant international opposition.¶ Meanwhile, and perhaps equally difficult for the parties involved, a young couple deliberated over whether they should purchase a large home to accommodate their growing family or should sacrifice living space to reside in an area with better public schools; elsewhere a college sophomore reconsidered his major and a senior her choice of law school, graduate school, or a job. Each of these\* situations called for decisions to be made. Each decision maker worked hard to make well-reasoned decisions.¶ Decision making is a thoughtful process of choosing among a variety of options for acting or thinking. It requires that the decider make a choice. Life demands decision making. We make countless individual decisions every day. To make some of those decisions, we work hard to employ care and consideration; others seem to just happen. Couples, families, groups of friends, and coworkers come together to make choices, and decision-making bodies from committees to juries to the U.S. Congress and the United Nations make decisions that impact us all. Every profession requires effective and ethical decision making, as do our school, community, and social organizations.¶ We all make many decisions every day. To refinance or sell one's home, to buy a high-performance SUV or an economical hybrid car. what major to select, what to have for dinner, what candidate to vote for, paper or plastic, all present us with choices. Should the president deal with an international crisis through military invasion or diplomacy? How should the U.S. Congress act to address illegal immigration?¶ Is the defendant guilty as accused? The Daily Show or the ball game? And upon what information should I rely to make my decision? Certainly some of these decisions are more consequential than others. Which amendment to vote for, what television program to watch, what course to take, which phone plan to purchase, and which diet to pursue all present unique challenges. At our best, we seek out research and data to inform our decisions. Yet even the choice of which information to attend to requires decision making. In 2006, TIME magazine named YOU its "Person of the Year." Congratulations! Its selection was based on the participation not of ''great men" in the creation of history, but rather on the contributions of a community of anonymous participants in the evolution of information. Through blogs. online networking. You Tube. Facebook, MySpace, Wikipedia, and many other "wikis," knowledge and "truth" are created from the bottom up, bypassing the authoritarian control of newspeople, academics, and publishers. We have access to infinite quantities of information, but how do we sort through it and select the best information for our needs?¶ The ability of every decision maker to make good, reasoned, and ethical decisions relies heavily upon their ability to think critically. Critical thinking enables one to break argumentation down to its component parts in order to evaluate its relative validity and strength. Critical thinkers are better users of information, as well as better advocates.¶ Colleges and universities expect their students to develop their critical thinking skills and may require students to take designated courses to that end. The importance and value of such study is widely recognized.¶ Much of the most significant communication of our lives is conducted in the form of debates. These may take place in intrapersonal communications, in which we weigh the pros and cons of an important decision in our own minds, or they may take place in interpersonal communications, in which we listen to arguments intended to influence our decision or participate in exchanges to influence the decisions of others.¶ Our success or failure in life is largely determined by our ability to make wise decisions for ourselves and to influence the decisions of others in ways that are beneficial to us. Much of our significant, purposeful activity is concerned with making decisions. Whether to join a campus organization, go to graduate school, accept a job oiler, buy a car or house, move to another city, invest in a certain stock, or vote for Garcia—these are just a few of the thousands of decisions we may have to make. Often, intelligent self-interest or a sense of responsibility will require us to win the support of others. We may want a scholarship or a particular job for ourselves, a customer for out product, or a vote for our favored political candidate.

#### Specifically, through discussing paths of government action, debate teaches us to be better organizational decision makers. Learning about the uniquely different considerations of organizations is necessary to affecting change in a world overwhelmingly dominated by institutions.

Algoso 2011 – Masters in Public Administration (May 31, Dave, “Why I got an MPA: Because organizations matter” <http://findwhatworks.wordpress.com/2011/05/31/why-i-got-an-mpa-because-organizations-matter/>)

Because organizations matter. Forget the stories of heroic individuals written in your middle school civics textbook. Nothing of great importance is ever accomplished by a single person. Thomas Edison had lab assistants, George Washington’s army had thousands of troops, and Mother Teresa’s Missionaries of Charity had over a million staff and volunteers when she passed away. Even Jesus had a 12-man posse. In different ways and in vastly different contexts, these were all organizations. Pick your favorite historical figure or contemporary hero, and I can almost guarantee that their greatest successes occurred as part of an organization. Even the most charismatic, visionary and inspiring leaders have to be able to manage people, or find someone who can do it for them. International development work is no different. Regardless of your issue of interest — whether private sector investment, rural development, basic health care, government capacity, girls’ education, or democracy promotion — your work will almost always involve operating within an organization. How well or poorly that organization functions will have dramatic implications for the results of your work. A well-run organization makes better decisions about staffing and operations; learns more from its mistakes; generates resources and commitment from external stakeholders; and structures itself to better promote its goals. None of this is easy or straightforward. We screw it up fairly often. Complaints about NGO management and government bureaucracy are not new. We all recognize the need for improvement. In my mind, the greatest challenges and constraints facing international development are managerial and organizational, rather than technical. Put another way: the greatest opportunities and leverage points lie in how we run our organizations. Yet our discourse about the international development industry focuses largely on how much money donors should commit to development and what technical solutions (e.g. deworming, elections, roads, whatever) deserve the funds. We give short shrift to the questions around how organizations can actually turn those funds into the technical solutions. The closest we come is to discuss the incentives facing organizations due to donor or political requirements. I think we can go deeper in addressing the management and organizational issues mentioned above. This thinking led me to an MPA degree because it straddles that space between organizations and issues. A degree in economics or international affairs could teach you all about the problems in the world, and you may even learn how to address them. But if you don’t learn how to operate in an organization, you may not be able to channel the resources needed to implement solutions. On the flip side, a typical degree in management offers relevant skills, but without the content knowledge necessary to understand the context and the issues. I think the MPA, if you choose the right program for you and use your time well, can do both.

#### Additionally, The best route to improving decision-making is through discussion about public policy

#### Mutually accessible information – There is a wide swath of literature on governmental policy topics – that ensures there will be informed, predictable, and in-depth debate over the aff’s decision. Individual policymaking is highly variable depending on the person and inaccessible to outsiders.

#### Harder decisions make better decisionmakers – The problems facing public policymakers are a magnitude greater than private decisions. We all know plans don’t actually happen, but practicing imagining the consequences of our decisions in the high-stakes games of public policymaking makes other decisionmaking easier.

#### External actors – the decisions we make should be analyzed not in a vacuum but in the complex social field that surrounds us

#### Second is Predictable Limits - The resolution proposes the question the negative is prepared to answer and creates a bounded list of potential affs for us to think about. Debate has unique potential to change attitudes and grow critical thinking skills because it forces pre-round internal deliberation on a of a focused, common ground of debate

Robert E. Goodin and Simon J. Niemeyer- Australian National University- 2003,

When Does Deliberation Begin? Internal Reflection versus Public Discussion in Deliberative Democracy, POLITICAL STUDIES: 2003 VOL 51, 627–649, http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.0032-3217.2003.00450.x/pdf

What happened in this particular case, as in any particular case, was in some respects peculiar unto itself. The problem of the Bloomfield Track had been well known and much discussed in the local community for a long time. Exaggerated claims and counter-claims had become entrenched, and unreflective public opinion polarized around them. In this circumstance, the effect of the information phase of deliberative processes was to brush away those highly polarized attitudes, dispel the myths and symbolic posturing on both sides that had come to dominate the debate, and liberate people to act upon their attitudes toward the protection of rainforest itself. The key point, from the perspective of ‘democratic deliberation within’, is that that happened in the earlier stages of deliberation – before the formal discussions (‘deliberations’, in the discursive sense) of the jury process ever began. The simple process of jurors seeing the site for themselves, focusing their minds on the issues and listening to what experts had to say did virtually all the work in changing jurors’ attitudes. Talking among themselves, as a jury, did very little of it. However, the same might happen in cases very different from this one. Suppose that instead of highly polarized symbolic attitudes, what we have at the outset is mass ignorance or mass apathy or non-attitudes. There again, people’s engaging with the issue – focusing on it, acquiring information about it, thinking hard about it – would be something that is likely to occur earlier rather than later in the deliberative process. And more to our point, it is something that is most likely to occur within individuals themselves or in informal interactions, well in advance of any formal, organized group discussion. There is much in the large literature on attitudes and the mechanisms by which they change to support that speculation.31 Consider, for example, the literature on ‘central’ versus ‘peripheral’ routes to the formation of attitudes. Before deliberation, individuals may not have given the issue much thought or bothered to engage in an extensive process of reflection.32 In such cases, positions may be arrived at via peripheral routes, taking cognitive shortcuts or arriving at ‘top of the head’ conclusions or even simply following the lead of others believed to hold similar attitudes or values (Lupia, 1994). These shorthand approaches involve the use of available cues such as ‘expertness’ or ‘attractiveness’ (Petty and Cacioppo, 1986) – not deliberation in the internal-reflective sense we have described. Where peripheral shortcuts are employed, there may be inconsistencies in logic and the formation of positions, based on partial information or incomplete information processing. In contrast, ‘central’ routes to the development of attitudes involve the application of more deliberate effort to the matter at hand, in a way that is more akin to the internal-reflective deliberative ideal. Importantly for our thesis, there is nothing intrinsic to the ‘central’ route that requires group deliberation. Research in this area stresses instead the importance simply of ‘sufficient impetus’ for engaging in deliberation, such as when an individual is stimulated by personal involvement in the issue.33 The same is true of ‘on-line’ versus ‘memory-based’ processes of attitude change.34 The suggestion here is that we lead our ordinary lives largely on autopilot, doing routine things in routine ways without much thought or reflection. When we come across something ‘new’, we update our routines – our ‘running’ beliefs and pro cedures, attitudes and evaluations – accordingly. But having updated, we then drop the impetus for the update into deep-stored ‘memory’. A consequence of this procedure is that, when asked in the ordinary course of events ‘what we believe’ or ‘what attitude we take’ toward something, we easily retrieve what we think but we cannot so easily retrieve the reasons why. That more fully reasoned assessment – the sort of thing we have been calling internal-reflective deliberation – requires us to call up reasons from stored memory rather than just consulting our running on-line ‘summary judgments’. Crucially for our present discussion, once again, what prompts that shift from online to more deeply reflective deliberation is not necessarily interpersonal discussion. The impetus for fixing one’s attention on a topic, and retrieving reasons from stored memory, might come from any of a number sources: group discussion is only one. And again, even in the context of a group discussion, this shift from ‘online’ to ‘memory-based’ processing is likely to occur earlier rather than later in the process, often before the formal discussion ever begins. All this is simply to say that, on a great many models and in a great many different sorts of settings, it seems likely that elements of the pre-discursive process are likely to prove crucial to the shaping and reshaping of people’s attitudes in a citizens’ jury-style process. The initial processes of focusing attention on a topic, providing information about it and inviting people to think hard about it is likely to provide a strong impetus to internal-reflective deliberation, altering not just the information people have about the issue but also the way people process that information and hence (perhaps) what they think about the issue. What happens once people have shifted into this more internal-reflective mode is, obviously, an open question. Maybe people would then come to an easy consensus, as they did in their attitudes toward the Daintree rainforest.35 Or maybe people would come to divergent conclusions; and they then may (or may not) be open to argument and counter-argument, with talk actually changing minds. Our claim is not that group discussion will always matter as little as it did in our citizens’ jury.36 Our claim is instead merely that the earliest steps in the jury process – the sheer focusing of attention on the issue at hand and acquiring more information about it, and the internal-reflective deliberation that that prompts – will invariably matter more than deliberative democrats of a more discursive stripe would have us believe. However much or little difference formal group discussions might make, on any given occasion, the pre-discursive phases of the jury process will invariably have a considerable impact on changing the way jurors approach an issue. From Citizens’ Juries to Ordinary Mass Politics? In a citizens’ jury sort of setting, then, it seems that informal, pre-group deliberation – ‘deliberation within’ – will inevitably do much of the work that deliberative democrats ordinarily want to attribute to the more formal discursive processes. What are the preconditions for that happening? To what extent, in that sense, can findings about citizens’ juries be extended to other larger or less well-ordered deliberative settings? Even in citizens’ juries, deliberation will work only if people are attentive, open and willing to change their minds as appropriate. So, too, in mass politics. In citizens’ juries the need to participate (or **the anticipation of participating) in formally organized group discussions might be the ‘prompt’ that evokes those attributes**. But there might be many other possible ‘prompts’ that can be found in less formally structured mass-political settings. Here are a few ways citizens’ juries (and all cognate micro-deliberative processes)37 might be different from mass politics, and in which lessons drawn from that experience might not therefore carry over to ordinary politics: • A citizens’ jury concentrates people’s minds on a single issue. Ordinary politics involve many issues at once. • A citizens’ jury is often supplied a background briefing that has been agreed by all stakeholders (Smith and Wales, 2000, p. 58). In ordinary mass politics, there is rarely any equivalent common ground on which debates are conducted. • A citizens’ jury separates the process of acquiring information from that of discussing the issues. In ordinary mass politics, those processes are invariably intertwined. • A citizens’ jury is provided with a set of experts. They can be questioned, debated or discounted. But there is a strictly limited set of ‘competing experts’ on the same subject. In ordinary mass politics, claims and sources of expertise often seem virtually limitless, allowing for much greater ‘selective perception’. • Participating in something called a ‘citizens’ jury’ evokes certain very particular norms: norms concerning the ‘impartiality’ appropriate to jurors; norms concerning the ‘common good’ orientation appropriate to people in their capacity as citizens.38 There is a very different ethos at work in ordinary mass politics, which are typically driven by flagrantly partisan appeals to sectional interest (or utter disinterest and voter apathy). • In a citizens’ jury, **we think and listen in anticipation of the discussion phase, knowing that we soon will have to defend our views in a discursive setting where they will be probed intensively**.39 In ordinary mass-political settings, there is no such incentive for paying attention. It is perfectly true that citizens’ juries are ‘special’ in all those ways. But if being special in all those ways makes for a better – more ‘reflective’, more ‘deliberative’ – political process, then those are design features that we ought try to mimic as best we can in ordinary mass politics as well. There are various ways that that might be done. Briefing books might be prepared by sponsors of American presidential debates (the League of Women Voters, and such like) in consultation with the stakeholders involved. Agreed panels of experts might be questioned on prime-time television. Issues might be sequenced for debate and resolution, to avoid too much competition for people’s time and attention. Variations on the Ackerman and Fishkin (2002) proposal for a ‘deliberation day’ before every election might be generalized, with a day every few months being given over to small meetings in local schools to discuss public issues. All that is pretty visionary, perhaps. And (although it is clearly beyond the scope of the present paper to explore them in depth) there are doubtless many other more-or-less visionary ways of introducing into real-world politics analogues of the elements that induce citizens’ jurors to practice ‘democratic deliberation within’, even before the jury discussion gets underway. Here, we have to content ourselves with identifying those features that need to be replicated in real-world politics in order to achieve that goal – and with the ‘possibility theorem’ that is established by the fact that (as sketched immediately above) there is at least one possible way of doing that for each of those key features.

#### Third is Dogmatism – Most problems are not black and white but have complex, uncertain interactions. By declaring that \_\_\_\_\_ is always bad, they prevent us from understanding the nuances of an incredibly important and complex issue. This is the epitome of dogmatism

Keller, et. al,– Asst. professor School of Social Service Administration U. of Chicago - 2001

(Thomas E., James K., and Tracly K., Asst. professor School of Social Service Administration U. of Chicago, professor of Social Work, and doctoral student School of Social Work, “Student debates in policy courses: promoting policy practice skills and knowledge through active learning,” Journal of Social Work Education, Spr/Summer 2001, EBSCOhost)

John Dewey, the philosopher and educational reformer, suggested that the initial advance in the development of reflective thought occurs in the transition from holding fixed, static ideas to an attitude of doubt and questioning engendered by exposure to alternative views in social discourse (Baker, 1955, pp. 36-40). Doubt, confusion, and conflict resulting from discussion of diverse perspectives "force comparison, selection, and reformulation of ideas and meanings" (Baker, 1955, p. 45). Subsequent educational theorists have contended that learning requires openness to divergent ideas in combination with the ability to synthesize disparate views into a purposeful resolution (Kolb, 1984; Perry, 1970). On the one hand, clinging to the certainty of one's beliefs risks dogmatism, rigidity, and the inability to learn from new experiences. On the other hand, if one's opinion is altered by every new experience, the result is insecurity, paralysis, and the inability to take effective action. The educator's role is to help students develop the capacity to incorporate new and sometimes conflicting ideas and experiences into a coherent cognitive framework. Kolb suggests that, "if the education process begins by bringing out the learner's beliefs and theories, examining and testing them, and then integrating the new, more refined ideas in the person's belief systems, the learning process will be facilitated" (p. 28).

The authors believe that involving students in substantive debates challenges them to learn and grow in the fashion described by Dewey and Kolb. Participation in a debate stimulates clarification and critical evaluation of the evidence, logic, and values underlying one's own policy position. In addition, to debate effectively students must understand and accurately evaluate the opposing perspective. The ensuing tension between two distinct but legitimate views is designed to yield a reevaluation and reconstruction of knowledge and beliefs pertaining to the issue.

#### Our method solves – Even if the resolution is wrong, having a devil’s advocate in deliberation is vitally important to critical thinking skills and avoiding groupthink

Hugo Mercier and Hélène Landemore- 2011

(Philosophy, Politics and Economics prof @ U of Penn, Poli Sci prof @ Yale), Reasoning is for arguing: Understanding the successes and failures of deliberation, Political Psychology, http://sites.google.com/site/hugomercier/publications

Reasoning can function outside of its normal conditions when it is used purely internally. But it is not enough for reasoning to be done in public to achieve good results. And indeed the problems of individual reasoning highlighted above, such as polarization and overconfidence, can also be found in group reasoning (Janis, 1982; Stasser & Titus, 1985; Sunstein, 2002). Polarization and overconfidence happen because not all group discussion is deliberative. According to some definitions of deliberation, including the one used in this paper, reasoning has to be applied to the same thread of argument *from different opinions* for deliberation to occur. As a consequence, “If the participants are mostly like-minded or hold the same views before they enter into the discussion, they are not situated in the circumstances of deliberation.” (Thompson, 2008: 502). We will presently review evidence showing that the absence or the silencing of dissent is a quasi-necessary condition for polarization or overconfidence to occur in groups. Group polarization has received substantial empirical support. 11 So much support in fact that Sunstein has granted group polarization the status of law (Sunstein, 2002). There is however an important caveat: group polarization will mostly happen when people share an opinion to begin with. In defense of his claim, Sunstein reviews an impressive number of empirical studies showing that many groups tend to form more extreme opinions following discussion. The examples he uses, however, offer as convincing an illustration of group polarization than of the necessity of having group members that share similar beliefs at the outset for polarization to happen (e.g. Sunstein, 2002: 178). Likewise, in his review of the group polarization literature, Baron notes that “The crucial antecedent condition for group polarization to occur is the presence of a likeminded group; i.e. individuals who share a preference for one side of the issue.” (Baron, 2005). Accordingly, when groups do not share an opinion, they tend to depolarize. This has been shown in several experiments in the laboratory (e.g. Kogan & Wallach, 1966; Vinokur & Burnstein, 1978). Likewise, studies of deliberation about political or legal issues report that many groups do not polarize (Kaplan & Miller, 1987; Luskin, Fishkin, & Hahn, 2007; Luskin et al., 2002; Luskin, Iyengar, & Fishkin, 2004; Mendelberg & Karpowitz, 2000). On the contrary, some groups show a homogenization of their attitude (they depolarize) (Luskin et al., 2007; Luskin et al., 2002). The contrasting effect of discussions with a supportive versus dissenting audience is transparent in the results reported by Hansen ( 2003 reported by Fishkin & Luskin, 2005). Participants had been exposed to new information about a political issue. When they discussed it with their family and friends, they learned more facts supporting their initial position. On the other hand, during the deliberative weekend—and the exposition to other opinions that took place—they learned more of the facts supporting the view they disagreed with. The present theory, far from being contradicted by the observation that groups of likeminded people reasoning together tend to polarize, can in fact account straightforwardly for this observation. When people are engaged in a genuine deliberation, the confirmation bias present in each individual’s reasoning is checked, compensated by the confirmation bias of individuals who defend another opinion. When no other opinion is present (or expressed, or listened to), people will be disinclined to use reasoning to critically examine the arguments put forward by other discussants, since they share their opinion. Instead, they will use reasoning to strengthen these arguments or find other arguments supporting the same opinion. In most cases the reasons each individual has for holding the same opinion will be partially non-overlapping. Each participant will then be exposed to new reasons supporting the common opinion, reasons that she is unlikely to criticize. It is then only to be expected that group members should strengthen their support for the common opinion in light of these new arguments. In fact, groups of like-minded people should have little endogenous motivation to start reasoning together: what is the point of arguing with people we agree with? In most cases, such groups are lead to argue because of some external constraint. These constraints can be more or less artificial—a psychologist telling participants to deliberate or a judge asking a jury for a well supported verdict—but they have to be factored in the explanation of the phenomenon. 4. Conclusion: a situational approach to improving reasoning We have argued that reasoning should not be evaluated primarily, if at all, as a device that helps us generate knowledge and make better decisions through private reflection. Reasoning, in fact, does not do those things very well. Instead, we rely on the hypothesis that the function of reasoning is to find and evaluate arguments in deliberative contexts. This evolutionary hypothesis explains why, when reasoning is used in its normal conditions—in a deliberation—it can be expected to lead to better outcomes, consistently allowing deliberating groups to reach epistemically superior outcomes and improve their epistemic status. Moreover, seeing reasoning as an argumentative device also provides a straightforward account of the otherwise puzzling confirmation bias—the tendency to search for arguments that favor our opinion. The confirmation bias, in turn, generates most of the problems people face when they reason in abnormal conditions— when they are not deliberating. This will happen to people who reason alone while failing to entertain other opinions in a private deliberation and to groups in which one opinion is so dominant as to make all others opinions—if they are even present—unable to voice arguments. In both cases, the confirmation bias will go unchecked and create polarization and overconfidence. We believe that the argumentative theory offers a good explanation of the most salient facts about private and public reasoning. This explanation is meant to supplement, rather than replace, existing psychological theories by providing both an answer to the why-questions and a coherent integrative framework for many previously disparate findings. The present article was mostly aimed at comparing deliberative vs. non-deliberative situations, but the theory could also be used to make finer grained predictions within deliberative situations. It is important to stress that the theory used as the backbone for the article is a theory of reasoning. The theory can only make predictions about reasoning, and not about the various other psychological mechanisms that impact the outcome of group discussion. We did not aim at providing a general theory of group processes that could account for all the results in this domain. But it is our contention that the best way to reach this end is by investigating the relevant psychological mechanisms and their interaction. For these reasons, the present article should only be considered a first step towards more fined grained predictions of when and why deliberation is efficient. Turning now to the consequences of the present theory, we can note first that our emphasis on the efficiency of diverse groups sits well with another recent a priori account of group competence. According to Hong and Page’s Diversity Trumps Ability Theorem for example, under certain plausible conditions, a diverse sample of moderately competent individuals will outperform a group of the most competent individuals (Hong & Page, 2004). Specifically, what explains the superiority of some groups of average people over smaller groups of experts is the fact that cognitive diversity (roughly, the ability to interpret the world differently) can be more crucial to group competence than individual ability (Page, 2007). That argument has been carried over from groups of problem-solvers in business and practical matters to democratically deliberating groups in politics (e.g., Anderson, 2006; Author, 2007, In press). At the practical level, the present theory potentially has important implications. Given that individual reasoning works best when confronted to different opinions, the present theory supports the improvement of the presence or expression of dissenting opinions in deliberative settings. Evidently, many people, in the field of deliberative democracy or elsewhere, are also advocating such changes. While these common sense suggestions have been made in the past (e.g., Bohman,

2007; Sunstein, 2003, 2006), the present theory provides additional arguments for them. It also explains why approaches focusing on individual rather than collective reasoning are not likely to be successful. Specifically tailored practical suggestions can also be made by using departures from the normal conditions of reasoning as diagnostic tools. Thus, different departures will entail different solutions. Accountability—having to defends one’s opinion in front of an audience—can be used to bring individual reasoners closer to a situation of private deliberation. The use of different aggregation mechanisms could help identify the risk of deliberation among like-minded people. For example, before a group launches a discussion, a preliminary vote or poll could establish the extent to which different opinions are represented. If this procedure shows that people agree on the issue at hand, then skipping the discussion may save the group some efforts and reduce the risk of polarization. Alternatively, a **devil’s advocate** could be introduced in the group to defend an alternative opinion (e.g. Schweiger, Sandberg, & Ragan, 1986).

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#### Obama’s Syria maneuver has maximized presidential war powers because it’s on his terms

Posner 9/3, Law Prof at University of Chicago

(Eric, Obama Is Only Making His War Powers Mightier, www.slate.com/articles/news\_and\_politics/view\_from\_chicago/2013/09/obama\_going\_to\_congress\_on\_syria\_he\_s\_actually\_strengthening\_the\_war\_powers.html)

President Obama’s surprise announcement that he will ask Congress for approval of a military attack on Syria is being hailed as a vindication of the rule of law and a revival of the central role of Congress in war-making, even by critics. But all of this is wrong. Far from breaking new legal ground, President Obama has reaffirmed the primacy of the executive in matters of war and peace. The war powers of the presidency remain as mighty as ever. It would have been different if the president had announced that only Congress can authorize the use of military force, as dictated by the Constitution, which gives Congress alone the power to declare war. That would have been worthy of notice, a reversal of the ascendance of executive power over Congress. But the president said no such thing. He said: “I believe I have the authority to carry out this military action without specific congressional authorization.” Secretary of State John Kerry confirmed that the president “has the right to do that”—launch a military strike—“no matter what Congress does.” Thus, the president believes that the law gives him the option to seek a congressional yes or to act on his own. He does not believe that he is bound to do the first. He has merely stated the law as countless other presidents and their lawyers have described it before him. The president’s announcement should be understood as a political move, not a legal one. His motive is both self-serving and easy to understand, and it has been all but acknowledged by the administration. If Congress now approves the war, it must share blame with the president if what happens next in Syria goes badly. If Congress rejects the war, it must share blame with the president if Bashar al-Assad gases more Syrian children. The big problem for Obama arises if Congress says no and he decides he must go ahead anyway, and then the war goes badly. He won’t have broken the law as he understands it, but he will look bad. He would be the first president ever to ask Congress for the power to make war and then to go to war after Congress said no. (In the past, presidents who expected dissent did not ask Congress for permission.) People who celebrate the president for humbly begging Congress for approval also apparently don’t realize that his understanding of the law—that it gives him the option to go to Congress—maximizes executive power vis-à-vis Congress. If the president were required to act alone, without Congress, then he would have to take the blame for failing to use force when he should and using force when he shouldn’t. If he were required to obtain congressional authorization, then Congress would be able to block him. But if he can have it either way, he can force Congress to share responsibility when he wants to and avoid it when he knows that it will stand in his way.

#### Drones are key to warfighting – they are the future of combat

Bruntstetter 12, Political Science Professor at UC Irvine

(Daniel, Drones: The Future of Warfare?, www.e-ir.info/2012/04/10/drones-the-future-of-warfare/)

Since President Obama took office, the use of and hype surrounding drones has greatly increased. Obama has conducted more than three times as many drone strikes per year compared to his predecessor in the White House. The increase use of drones points to a potential revolution in warfare, or at least a shift in the perspective of how wars will be fought in the future. As robotics expert P.W. Singer argues, “the introduction of unmanned systems to the battlefield doesn’t change simply how we fight, but for the first time changes who fights at the most fundamental level. It transforms the very agent of war, rather than just its capabilities.” The three major reasons drones are seen as the future of warfare are: they remove the risk to our soldiers, they make fewer mistakes than other weapons platforms, and technology will continue to improve such that drones become even more precise, efficient, and infallible in the future, thus rendering less precise, efficient and fallible human forms of war obsolete. Drones are thus seen as marking “a step forward in humanitarian technology,” and viewed as “a weapon of choice for future presidents, future administrations, in future conflicts and circumstances of self-defense and vital national security of the United States.” Yet, there has been much criticism of these assertions. Journalists challenge the claim that there are diminished civilian deaths from drone strikes, while just war scholars suggest that drones loosen the moral restraints on the use of force and legal scholars grapple with the relation between drones and international law. Notwithstanding these ethical and legal challenges, and despite what advocates say about their place in the future of armed combat, drones are, like any weapons platform, inherently limited in what they can do. In this brief article, I make three claims to contextualize the idea that drones are the future of war to shed light on the circumscribed role they might play in the foreseeable future. First, that drones are an improvement – in terms of providing surveillance capabilities and satisfying the rules of war – compared to previous technology. Their technical advantages (loitering capacity, removal of risk to pilots, and precision) make them an important addition to any military arsenal.

#### Loss of warfighting effectiveness ensures nuclear war in every hotspot

Kagan and O’Hanlon 07, resident scholar at AEI and senior fellow in foreign policy at Brookings

(Frederick and Michael, The Case for Larger Ground Forces, April, http://www.aei.org/files/2007/04/24/20070424\_Kagan20070424.pdf)

We live at a time when **wars not only rage in nearly every region but threaten to erupt in many places where the current relative calm is** tenuous. To view this as **a strategic military challenge for the U**nited **S**tates **is not to espouse a specific theory of America’s role in the world** or a certain political philosophy. Such an assessment flows directly from the basic bipartisan view of American foreign policy makers since World War II that **overseas threats must be countered before they can directly threaten this country’s shores**, that the **basic stability of the international system is essential to American peace** and prosperity, **and that no country besides the U**nited **S**tates **is in a position to lead the way in countering major challenges to the global order**. Let us highlight the **threats and their consequences** with a few concrete examples, emphasizing those **that involve key strategic regions of the world such as the Persian Gulf and East Asia, or** key potential **threats to American security, such as the spread of nuclear weapons and** the strengthening of the global **Al Qaeda**/jihadist movement. The Iranian government has rejected a series of international demands to halt its efforts at enriching uranium and submit to international inspections. What will happen if the US—or Israeli—government becomes convinced that Tehran is on the verge of fielding a nuclear weapon? North **Korea**, of course, has already done so, and the ripple effects are beginning to spread. Japan’s recent election to supreme power of a leader who has promised to rewrite that country’s constitution to support increased armed forces—and, possibly, even nuclear weapons— may well alter the delicate balance of fear in Northeast Asia fundamentally and rapidly. Also, in the background, at least for now, Sino Taiwanese tensions continue to flare, as do tensions between India and Pakistan, Pakistan and Afghanistan, Venezuela and the United States, and so on. Meanwhile, the world’s nonintervention in Darfur troubles consciences from Europe to America’s Bible Belt to its bastions of liberalism, yet with no serious international forces on offer, the bloodletting will probably, tragically, continue unabated. And as bad as things are in Iraq today, they could get worse. What would happen if the key Shiite figure, Ali al Sistani, were to die? If another major attack on the scale of the Golden Mosque bombing hit either side (or, perhaps, both sides at the same time)? Such deterioration might convince many Americans that the war there truly was lost—but the costs of reaching such a conclusion would be enormous. Afghanistan is somewhat more stable for the moment, although a major Taliban offensive appears to be in the offing. Sound US grand strategy must proceed from the recognition that, over the next few years and decades, the world is going to be a very unsettled and quite dangerous place, with Al Qaeda and its associated groups as a subset of a much larger set of worries. The only serious response to this international environment is to develop armed forces capable of protecting America’s vital interests throughout this dangerous time**.** Doing so requires a military capable of a wide range of missions—including not only deterrence of great power conflict in dealing with potential hotspots in Korea, the Taiwan Strait, and the Persian Gulf but also associated with a variety of Special Forces activities and stabilization operations. For today’s US military, which already excels at high technology and is increasingly focused on re-learning the lost art of counterinsurgency, this is first and foremost a question of finding the resources to field a large-enough standing Army and Marine Corps to handle personnel intensive missions such as the ones now under way in Iraq and Afghanistan.

### 1NC

**THE REDUCTION OF CLASS TO A NEUTRAL LEVEL AMONG A LONG LIST OF OTHER OPPRESSIONS SUCH AS RACISM DESTROYS THE EMANCIPATORY POTENTIAL OF CLASS TO REACH ACROSS ALL LINES OF INDENTITY AND FORGE POLITICAL ACTION. CLASS MUST BE RECOGNIZED AS QUALITATIVELY MORE IMPORTANT—OTHERWISE THE SYSTEM IS ABLE TO SATISFY DEMANDS ON GROUNDS OF FORMAL EQUALITY, DESTROYING ATTEMPTS TO OVERCOME CAPITALIST OPPRESSION\*\*\***

**GIMENEZ** (Prof. Sociology at UC Boulder) **2001**

[Martha, “Marxism and Class; Gender and Race”, Race, Gender and Class, Vol. 8, p. online: <http://www.colorado.edu/Sociology/gimenez/work/cgr.html> //wyo-tjc]

There are many competing theories of race, gender, class, American society, political economy, power, etc. but no specific theory is invoked to define how the terms race, gender and class are used, or to identify how they are related to the rest of the social system. To some extent, race, gender and class and their intersections and interlockings have become a mantra to be invoked in any and all theoretical contexts, for a tacit agreement about their ubiquitousness and meaning seems to have developed among RGC studies advocates, so that all that remains to be dome is empirically to document their intersections everywhere, for everything that happens is, by definition, raced, classed, and gendered. This pragmatic acceptance of race, gender and class, as givens, results in the downplaying of theory, and the resort to experience as the source of knowledge. The emphasis on experience in the construction of knowledge is intended as a corrective to theories that, presumably, reflect only the experience of the powerful. RGC seems to offer a subjectivist understanding of theory as simply a reflection of the experience and consciousness of the individual theorist, rather than as a body of propositions which is collectively and systematically produced under historically specific conditions of possibility which grant them historical validity for as long as those conditions prevail. Instead, knowledge and theory are pragmatically conceived as the products or reflection of experience and, as such, unavoidably partial, so that greater accuracy and relative completeness can be approximated only through gathering the experiential accounts of all groups. Such is the importance given to the role of experience in the production of knowledge that in the eight page introduction to the first section of an RGC anthology, the word experience is repeated thirty six times (Andersen and Collins, 1995: 1-9). I agree with the importance of learning from the experience of all groups, especially those who have been silenced by oppression and exclusion and by the effects of ideologies that mystify their actual conditions of existence. To learn how people describe their understanding of their lives is very illuminating, for "ideas are the conscious expression -- real or illusory -- of (our) actual relations and activities" (Marx, 1994: 111), because "social existence determines consciousness" (Marx, 1994: 211). Given that our existence is shaped by the capitalist mode of production, experience, to be fully understood in its broader social and political implications, has to be situated in the context of the capitalist forces and relations that produce it. Experience in itself, however, is suspect because, dialectically, it is a unity of opposites; it is, at the same time, unique, personal, insightful and revealing and, at the same time, thoroughly social, partial, mystifying, itself the product of historical forces about which individuals may know little or nothing about (for a critical assessment of experience as a source of knowledge see Sherry Gorelick, "Contradictions of feminist methodology," in Chow, Wilkinson, and Baca Zinn, 1996; applicable to the role of experience in contemporary RGC and feminist research is Jacoby's critique of the 1960s politics of subjectivity: Jacoby, 1973: 37- 49). Given the emancipatory goals of the RGC perspective, it is through the analytical tools of Marxist theory that it can move forward, beyond the impasse revealed by the constant reiteration of variations on the "interlocking" metaphor. This would require, however, a) a rethinking and modification of the postulated relationships between race, class and gender, and b) a reconsideration of the notion that, because everyone is located at the intersection of these structures, all social relations and interactions are "raced," "classed," and "gendered." In the RGC perspective, race, gender and class are presented as equivalent systems of oppression with extremely negative consequences for the oppressed. It is also asserted that the theorization of the connections between these systems require "a working hypothesis of equivalency" (Collins, 1997:74). Whether or not it is possible to view class as just another system of oppression depends on the theoretical framework within class is defined. If defined within the traditional sociology of stratification perspective, in terms of a gradation perspective, class refers simply to strata or population aggregates ranked on the basis of standard SES indicators (income, occupation, and education) (for an excellent discussion of the difference between gradational and relational concepts of class, see Ossowski, 1963). Class in this non-relational, descriptive sense has no claims to being more fundamental than gender or racial oppression; it simply refers to the set of individual attributes that place individuals within an aggregate or strata arbitrarily defined by the researcher (i.e., depending on their data and research purposes, anywhere from three or four to twelve "classes" can be identified). From the standpoint of Marxist theory, however, class is qualitatively different from gender and race and cannot be considered just another system of oppression. As Eagleton points out, whereas racism and sexism are unremittingly bad, class is not entirely a "bad thing" even though socialists would like to abolish it. The bourgeoisie in its revolutionary stage was instrumental in ushering a new era in historical development, one which liberated the average person from the oppressions of feudalism and put forth the ideals of liberty, equality and fraternity. Today, however, it has an unquestionably negative role to play as it expands and deepens the rule of capital over the entire globe. The working class, on the other hand, is pivotally located to wage the final struggle against capital and, consequently, it is "an excellent thing" (Eagleton, 1996: 57). While racism and sexism have no redeeming feature, class relations are, dialectically, a unity of opposites; both a site of exploitation and, objectively, a site where the potential agents of social change are forged. To argue that the working class is the fundamental agent of change does not entail the notion that it is the only agent of change. The working class is of course composed of women and men who belong to different races, ethnicities, national origins, cultures, and so forth, so that gender and racial/ethnic struggles have the potential of fueling class struggles because, given the patterns of wealth ownership and income distribution in this and all capitalist countries, those who raise the banners of gender and racial struggles are overwhelmingly propertyless workers, technically members of the working class, people who need to work for economic survival whether it is for a wage or a salary, for whom racism, sexism and class exploitation matter. But this vision of a mobilized working class where gender and racial struggles are not subsumed but are nevertheless related requires a class conscious effort to link RGC studies to the Marxist analysis of historical change. In so far as the "class" in RGC remains a neutral concept, open to any and all theoretical meanings, just one oppression among others, intersectionality will not realize its revolutionary potential. Nevertheless, I want to argue against the notion that class should be considered equivalent to gender and race. I find the grounds for my argument not only on the crucial role class struggles play in processes of epochal change but also in the very assumptions of RGC studies and the ethnomethodological insights put forth by West and Fenstermaker (1994). The assumption of the simultaneity of experience (i.e., all interactions are raced, classed, gendered) together with the ambiguity inherent in the interactions themselves, so that while one person might think he or she is "doing gender," another might interpret those "doings" in terms of "doing class," highlight the basic issue that Collins accurately identifies when she argues that ethnomethodology ignores power relations. Power relations underlie all processes of social interaction and this is why social facts are constraining upon people. But the pervasiveness of power ought not to obfuscate the fact that some power relations are more important and consequential than others. For example, the power that physical attractiveness might confer a woman in her interactions with her less attractive female supervisor or employer does not match the economic power of the latter over the former. In my view, the flattening or erasure of the qualitative difference between class, race and gender in the RGC perspective is the foundation for the recognition that it is important to deal with "basic relations of domination and subordination" which now appear disembodied, outside class relations. In the effort to reject "class reductionism," by postulating the equivalence between class and other forms of oppression, the RGC perspective both negates the fundamental importance of class but it is forced to acknowledge its importance by postulating some other "basic" structures of domination. Class relations -- whether we are referring to the relations between capitalist and wage workers, or to the relations between workers (salaried and waged) and their managers and supervisors, those who are placed in "contradictory class locations," (Wright, 1978) -- are of paramount importance, for most people's economic survival is determined by them. Those in dominant class positions do exert power over their employees and subordinates and a crucial way in which that power is used is through their choosing the identity they impute their workers. Whatever identity workers might claim or "do," employers can, in turn, disregard their claims and "read" their "doings" differently as "raced" or "gendered" or both, rather than as "classed," thus downplaying their class location and the class nature of their grievances. To argue, then, that class is fundamental is not to "reduce" gender or racial oppression to class, but to acknowledge that the underlying basic and "nameless" power at the root of what happens in social interactions grounded in "intersectionality" is class power.

#### Capitalism causes extinction and destroys value to life

Simonovic 7 [Ljubodrag, Ph.D. in Philosophy; M.A. in Law; author of seven books, 2007, A New World is Possible, “Basis of contemporary critical theory of capitalism.”] Gender edited

The final stage of a mortal combat between [hu]mankind and capitalism is in progress. A specificity of capitalism is that, in contrast to "classical" barbarism (which is of destructive, murderous and plundering nature), it annihilates life by creating a "new world" – a "technical civilization" and an adequate, dehumanized and denaturalized man. Capitalism has eradicated man from his (natural) environment and has cut off the roots through which he had drawn life-creating force. Cities are "gardens" of capitalism where degenerated creatures "grow". Dog excrement, gasoline and sewerage stench, glaring advertisements and police car rotating lights that howl through the night - this is the environment of the "free world" man. By destroying the natural environment capitalism creates increasingly extreme climatic conditions in which man is [people are] struggling harder and harder to survive – and creates artificial living conditions accessible solely to the richest layer of population, which cause definitive degeneration of man [people] as a natural being[s]. "Humanization of life" is being limited to creation of micro-climatic conditions, of special capitalistic incubators - completely commercialized artificial living conditions to which degenerated people are appropriate. The most dramatic truth is: capitalism can survive the death of man as a human and biological being. For capitalism a "traditional man [person]" is merely a temporary means of its own reproduction. "Consumer-man [person]" represents a transitional phase in the capitalism-caused process of mutation of man towards the "highest" form of capitalistic man: a robot-man. "Terminators" and other robotized freaks which are products of the Hollywood entertainment industry which creates a "vision of the future" degenerated in a capitalist manner, incarnate creative powers, alienated from man, which become vehicles for destruction of man and life. A new "super race" of robotized humanoids is being created, which should clash with "traditional mankind", meaning with people capable of loving, thinking, daydreaming, fighting for freedom and survival - and impose their rule over the Earth. Instead of the new world, the "new man" is being created - who has been reduced to a level of humanity which cannot jeopardize the ruling order. Science and technique have become the basic lever of capital for the destruction of the world and the creation of "technical civilization". It is not only about destruction achieved by the use of technical means. It is about technicization of social institutions, of interpersonal relations, of the human body. Increasing transformation of nature into a surrogate of "nature", increasing dehumanization of the society and increasing denaturalization of man are direct consequences of capital's effort, within an increasingly merciless global economic war, to achieve complete commercialization of both natural and the social environment. The optimism of the Enlightenment could hardly be unreservedly supported nowadays, the notion of Marx that man imposes on himself only such tasks as he can solve, particularly the optimism based on the myth of the "omnipotence" of science and technique. The race for profits has already caused irreparable and still unpredictable damage to both man and his environment. By the creation of "consumer society", which means through the transition of capitalism into a phase of pure destruction, such a qualitative rise in destruction of nature and [hu]mankind has been performed that life on the planet is literally facing a "countdown". Instead of the "withering away" (Engels) of institutions of the capitalist society, the withering away of life is taking place.

#### Vote Negative to validate and adopt the method of structural/historical criticism that is the 1NC.

**Tumino 01**

[Stephen Tumino, Prof. English @ Pitt “What is Orthodox Marxism and Why it Matters Now More than Ever”, Red Critique, 2001 p. online]

Any effective political theory will have to do at least two things: it will have to offer an integrated understanding of social practices and, based on such an interrelated knowledge, offer a guideline for praxis. My main argument here is that among all contesting social theories now, only Orthodox Marxism has been able to produce an integrated knowledge of the existing social totality and provide lines of praxis that will lead to building a society free from necessity. But first I must clarify what I mean by Orthodox Marxism. Like all other modes and forms of political theory, the very theoretical identity of Orthodox Marxism is itself contested—not just from non-and anti-Marxists who question the very "real" (by which they mean the "practical" as under free-market criteria) existence of any kind of Marxism now but, perhaps more tellingly, from within the Marxist tradition itself. I will, therefore, first say what I regard to be the distinguishing marks of Orthodox Marxism and then outline a short polemical map of contestation over Orthodox Marxism within the Marxist theories now. I will end by arguing for its effectivity in bringing about a new society based not on human rights but on freedom from necessity. I will argue that to know contemporary society—and to be able to act on such knowledge—one has to first of all know what makes the existing social totality. I will argue that the dominant social totality is based on inequality—not just inequality of power but inequality of economic access (which then determines access to health care, education, housing, diet, transportation, . . . ). This systematic inequality cannot be explained by gender, race, sexuality, disability, ethnicity, or nationality. These are all secondary contradictions and are all determined by the fundamental contradiction of capitalism which is inscribed in the relation of capital and labor. All modes of Marxism now explain social inequalities primarily on the basis of these secondary contradictions and in doing so—and this is my main argument—legitimate capitalism. Why? Because such arguments authorize capitalism without gender, race, discrimination and thus accept economic inequality as an integral part of human societies. They accept a sunny capitalism—a capitalism beyond capitalism. Such a society, based on cultural equality but economic inequality, has always been the not-so-hidden agenda of the bourgeois left—whether it has been called "new left," "postmarxism," or "radical democracy." This is, by the way, the main reason for its popularity in the culture industry—from the academy (Jameson, Harvey, Haraway, Butler,. . . ) to daily politics (Michael Harrington, Ralph Nader, Jesse Jackson,. . . ) to. . . . For all, capitalism is here to stay and the best that can be done is to make its cruelties more tolerable, more humane. This humanization (not eradication) of capitalism is the sole goal of ALL contemporary lefts (marxism, feminism, anti-racism, queeries, . . . ). Such an understanding of social inequality is based on the fundamental understanding that the source of wealth is human knowledge and not human labor. That is, wealth is produced by the human mind and is thus free from the actual objective conditions that shape the historical relations of labor and capital. Only Orthodox Marxism recognizes the historicity of labor and its primacy as the source of all human wealth. In this paper I argue that any emancipatory theory has to be founded on recognition of the priority of Marx's labor theory of value and not repeat the technological determinism of corporate theory ("knowledge work") that masquerades as social theory.

### Case

#### Util – even if extinction is inevitable – taking steps to postpone it solves suffering and adds value to life

Epstein and Zhao 9 (Richard and Y, Laboratory of Computational Oncology, Department of Medicine, University of Hong Kong, “The threat that dare not speak its name: human extinction”, Perspectives in Biology and Medicine, Volume 52, Number 1 (winter 2009): 116-25 Project Muse)

Human extinction is 100% certain—the only uncertainties are when and how. Like the men and women of Shakespeare’s As You Like It, our species is but one of many players making entrances and exits on the evolutionary stage. That we generally deny that such exits for our own species are possible is to be expected, given the brutish selection pressures on our biology. Death, which is merely a biological description of evolutionary selection, is fundamental to life as we know it. Similarly, death occurring at the level of a species—extinction—is as basic to biology as is the death of individual organisms or cells. Hence, to regard extinction as catastrophic—which implies that it may somehow never occur, provided that we are all well behaved—is not only specious, but self-defeating. Man is both blessed and cursed by the highest level of self-awareness of any life-form on Earth. This suggests that the process of human extinction is likely to be accompanied by more suffering than that associated with any previous species extinction event. Such suffering may only be eased by the getting of wisdom: the same kind of wisdom that could, if applied sufficiently early, postpone extinction. But the tragedy of our species is that evolution does not select for such foresight. Man’s dreams of being an immortal species in an eternal paradise are unachievable not because of original sin—the doomsday scenario for which we choose to blame our “free will,” thereby perpetuating our creationist illusion of being at the center of the universe—but rather, in reductionist terms, because paradise is incompatible with evolution. More scientific effort in propounding this central truth of our species’ mortality, rather than seeking spiritual comfort in escapist fantasies, could pay dividends in minimizing the eventual cumulative burden of human suffering.

#### Even if security and risk calculation are flawed, engaging in them creates discourse of social welfare and promotes a democratic civic culture that checks political exclusion and loss of value to life

Loader – Criminology Prof at Oxford – 7

(Civilizing Security, Pg. 5)

Faced with such inhospitable conditions, one can easily lapse into fatalistic despair, letting events simply come as they will, or else seek refuge in the consolations offered by the total critique of securitization practices – a path that some critical scholars in criminology and security studies have found all too seductive (e.g. Bigo 2002, 2006; Walters 2003). Or one can, as we have done, supplement social criticism with the hard, uphill, necessarily painstaking work of seeking to specify what it may mean for citizens to live together securely with risk; to think about the social and political arrangements capable of making this possibility more rather than less likely, and to do what one can to nurture practices of collective security shaped not by fugitive market power or by the unfettered actors of (un)civil society, but by an inclusive, democratic politics. Social analysts of crime and security have become highly attuned to, and warned repeatedly of, the illiberal, exclusionary effects of the association between security and political community (Dillon 1996; Hughes 2007). They have not, it should be said, done so without cause, for reasons we set out at some length as the book unfolds. But this sharp sensitivity to the risks of thinking about security through a communitarian lens has itself come at a price, namely, that of failing to address and theorize fully the virtues and social benefits that can flow from members of a political community being able to put and pursue security in common. This, it seems to us, is a failure to heed the implications of the stake that all citizens have in security; to appreciate the closer alignment of self-interest and altruism that can attend the acknowledgement that we are forced to live, as Kant put it, inescapably side-by-side and that individuals simultaneously constitute and threaten one another’s security; and to register the security-enhancing significance and value of the affective bonds of trust and abstract solidarity that political communities depend upon, express and sustain. All this, we think, offers reasons to believe that security offers a conduit, perhaps the best conduit there is, for giving practical meaning to the idea of the public good, for reinventing social democratic politics, even for renewing the activity of politics at all.

**Turn — discussion of global problems stops crisis-driven responses and fosters empathy**

**Ungar 5,** president – Goucher College, 2005 [Sanford, “compassion fatigue: the next wave?”, winter, www.goucher.edu/x4726.xml]

There is a temptation to worry that before long, we will be hit by one more severe case of what has come to be known as “compassion fatigue”—a deadening of our sensibilities by the unrelenting bombardment of shallow and sensationalist media coverage of disease, famine, death, and war. Susan D. Moeller, a well-traveled observer who now teaches at the University of Maryland, has written tellingly of this phenomenon. “Through a choice of language and images,” she says, “the newest event is represented as more extreme than a similar past situation.” When we use the same extreme words to describe very different events, we undermine our ability to differentiate among them. Our sense of tragedy and cataclysm can be ratcheted only so high before we simply become overwhelmed. Some news organizations try to hold our attention by personalizing the events—pointing out, for example, that U.S. citizens perished in the tsunami, or drawing comparisons between this disaster overseas and others closer to international problems. “Why, to listen to NPR,” he complained, “you would think that there is trouble everywhere. It’s exhausting.” Visitors from across the country—sufferers all from compassion fatigue, I suppose—nodded their heads in agreement. “Well,” I said, as I attempted to confront him later, “there **really is a lot to worry about** in the world, and someone has to call our attention to it.” He was not about to be persuaded, preferring instead to focus on the customary agenda of parochial issues facing Americans. There’s a real danger in that attitude. If we allow our exhaustion to keep us from thinking about global concerns, we risk ignoring some important issues that may deserve a place in our consciousness alongside our domestic debates. By now it should be obvious that events and conditions around the world can have a profound impact on Main Street America. One would think there is plenty of evidence to make the point: the crisis- inspired fluctuation in gasoline prices at the pump; the international shortage of steel and concrete due to the construction boom in China; and the ebb and flow of immigration to the United States on the basis of circumstances in Mexico and Central America, among other places. Not to mention the consequences we have all experienced, in varying ways and to varying degrees, as a result of the Iraq war. The tsunami has ramifications for Americans beyond what might seem immediately apparent. It has been suggested that American generosity toward these countries with large Muslim populations could have an important restorative effect on the United States’ image throughout the Muslim world. It’s a shame it took a catastrophe like this to get us interested in what’s going on there. Perhaps if we **paid closer attention** to the concerns of others over a sustained period of time, we would gain a better understanding of the global disparities that breed problems like terrorism—and, in the process, go a long way toward making the world safer for everyone. In the heat of political battle, in the midst of some of our own legitimate preoccupations, it may have become more difficult to sustain the argument that Americans’ lives are meaningfully affected by poverty, disease, and tragedy in distant, hard-to-pronounce places. But we **must not turn our attention away**, and we must demand that those we entrust to report the news be not only **vigilant, but also responsible**, in their presentation of global events. Otherwise, we will be **doomed to await the tsunamis of history**, literal and figurative, to help us figure out what is really going on.

#### **Drones minimize civilian casualties – precision weapons, target tracking, and avoids combat stress.**

Schmitt 11, Professor of International Law @ U.S. Naval War College

(Michael N. Schmitt, ex-Professor of Law @ Durham University, “Drone Attacks Under the Jus Ad Bellum and Jus In Bello: Clearing the ‘Fog of Law’”, Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law, 3/2/11)

Some of the controversy surrounds the facts that the drones are piloted from a ground station that may be based thousands of miles away and that the attacks are conducted using video feeds with no human „eyes on target‟. This purportedly results in mistaken attacks or unnecessary civilian casualties. Such counterfactual criticism merits only short shrift. Drone attacks rely on high resolution imagery usually transmitted in real time to a drone crew which, undistracted by any threat, engages the target. When feasible and necessary, drones can be used to carefully monitor the potential target for extended periods before engaging it with precision weapons. Compared to attacks by manned aircraft or ground-based systems, the result is often a significantly reduced risk of misidentifying the target or causing collateral damage to civilians and civilian property. For instance, a drone can track a target, attacking only when he is at some distance from civilians. It can also be used to conduct the „pattern of life‟ analysis that is now common in targeting conducted by advanced militaries. In such an analysis, the activities of the civilian population are monitored to assess when and where an attack may be conducted to best avoid causing civilian casualties. Moreover, the weapons employed by drones are generally as good as or better than those carried by manned aircraft. And, because the crew is not at risk, drone operations avoid the stress of combat and its attendant tendency to thicken the fog of war.

#### **Drones are the best option for strikes – least civilian casualties, most efficient strikes, avoids legal issues, and disrupts terrorist communications and training.**

Byman 13 Professor in Security Studies @ Georgetown

(Daniel Byman, , Senior Fellow in Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution, Foreign Affairs Vol. 92 Iss. 4, “Why Drones Work”, EBSCO, acc. 6/26/13)

The Obama administration relies on drones for one simple reason: they work. According to data compiled by the New America Foundation, since Obama has been in the White House, U.S. drones have killed an estimated 3,300 al Qaeda, Taliban, and other jihadist operatives in Pakistan and Yemen. That number includes over 50 senior leaders of al Qaeda and the Taliban -- top figures who are not easily replaced. In 2010, Osama bin Laden warned his chief aide, Atiyah Abd al-Rahman, who was later killed by a drone strike in the Waziristan region of Pakistan in 2011, that when experienced leaders are eliminated, the result is "the rise of lower leaders who are not as experienced as the former leaders" and who are prone to errors and miscalculations. And drones also hurt terrorist organizations when they eliminate operatives who are lower down on the food chain but who boast special skills: passport forgers, bomb makers, recruiters, and fundraisers.¶ Drones have also undercut terrorists' ability to communicate

and to train new recruits. In order to avoid attracting drones, al Qaeda and Taliban operatives try to avoid using electronic devices or gathering in large numbers. A tip sheet found among jihadists in Mali advised militants to "maintain complete silence of all wireless contacts" and "avoid gathering in open areas." Leaders, however, cannot give orders when they are incommunicado, and training on a large scale is nearly impossible when a drone strike could wipe out an entire group of new recruits. Drones have turned al Qaeda's command and training structures into a liability, forcing the group to choose between having no leaders and risking dead leaders.¶ Critics of drone strikes often fail to take into account the fact that the alternatives are either too risky or unrealistic. To be sure, in an ideal world, militants would be captured alive, allowing authorities to question them and search their compounds for useful information. Raids, arrests, and interrogations can produce vital intelligence and can be less controversial than lethal operations. That is why they should be, and indeed already are, used in stable countries where the United States enjoys the support of the host government. But in war zones or unstable countries, such as Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia, arresting militants is highly dangerous and, even if successful, often inefficient. In those three countries, the government exerts little or no control over remote areas, which means that it is highly dangerous to go after militants hiding out there. Worse yet, in Pakistan and Yemen, the governments have at times cooperated with militants. If the United States regularly sent in special operations forces to hunt down terrorists there, sympathetic officials could easily tip off the jihadists, likely leading to firefights, U.S. casualties, and possibly the deaths of the suspects and innocent civilians.¶ Of course, it was a Navy SEAL team and not a drone strike that finally got bin Laden, but in many cases in which the United States needs to capture or eliminate an enemy, raids are too risky and costly. And even if a raid results in a successful capture, it begets another problem: what to do with the detainee. Prosecuting detainees in a federal or military court is difficult because often the intelligence against terrorists is inadmissible or using it risks jeopardizing sources and methods. And given the fact that the United States is trying to close, rather than expand, the detention facility at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, it has become much harder to justify holding suspects indefinitely. It has become more politically palatable for the United States to kill rather than detain suspected terrorists.¶ Furthermore, although a drone strike may violate the local state's sovereignty, it does so to a lesser degree than would putting U.S. boots on the ground or conducting a large-scale air campaign. And compared with a 500-pound bomb dropped from an F-16, the grenadelike warheads carried by most drones create smaller, more precise blast zones that decrease the risk of unexpected structural damage and casualties. Even more important, drones, unlike traditional airplanes, can loiter above a target for hours, waiting for the ideal moment to strike and thus reducing the odds that civilians will be caught in the kill zone.¶ Finally, using drones is also far less bloody than asking allies to hunt down terrorists on the United States' behalf. The Pakistani and Yemeni militaries, for example, are known to regularly torture and execute detainees, and they often indiscriminately bomb civilian areas or use scorched-earth tactics against militant groups.

#### Engaging with experts is necessary for genuine political discussion

Turner, Graduate Research Professor and Chair of the Department of Philosophy at the University of South Florida, ‘1 (Stephen, February “What is the Problem with Experts?” Social Studies of Science, Vol 31 Issue 1, p 123-149, Sage Publications)

The answer to Fish is to treat the liberal principle of neutrality not as an absolute assertion about the nature of beliefs, but as a core rule, whose application varies historically, whose main point is to establish a means of organizing the discussion of political matters, that is to say the discussion of political decisions. We can apply this to the problem of expertise as follows: it is no surprise that, in order for there to be genuine discussion in Schmitt's sense, some things would be temporarily taken for fact, or, alternatively, some things would be left to the experts to settle. 'Politiciz­ing' everything, making everything into the subject of political decision­making (or treating it as an analogue to political decision-making), would lose the advantages of the intellectual division of labour and make reasoned persuasion impossible. Some facts need to be taken for granted in order for there to be genuine political discussion, and some of the work of establish­ing the facts is, properly, delegated to experts. Indeed, to imagine a world in which such delegation did not occur would be to imagine a simpler society, at best a society of Jeffersonian yeomen, in which everyone knew pretty much what everyone else knew that was relevant to public decision­making. To preserve the possibility of political discussion that such societies established, it is essential to delegate to experts and grant them cognitive authority. But granting them cognitive authority is not the same as grant­ing them some sort of absolute and unquestionable power over us. The fact that expertise goes through a process of legitimation also means that legitimacy may be withdrawn and the cognitive authority of experts may collapse, and this suggests something quite different than the idea that liberalism is a kind of self-contradiction, and also something much more interesting. We, the non-experts, decide whether claims to cognitive au­thority, which in political terms are requests to have their conclusions treated as neutral fact, are to be honoured. And we have, historically, changed our minds about who is 'expert', and what is to be treated as neutral fact. This is, so to speak, a 'liberal' argument about expertise. It grants that cognitive authority and the acceptance of expertise, in modern conditions, is a condition of genuine public discourse. Liberalism, in the form of the principle of neutrality, is a means to the end of the creation of the conditions for public discourse. It is a means, however, that is not given by God, or the courts, or 'reason', but lives in the political decisions we make to regard assertions as open to public discussion or not. Historically, liberalism established the space for public discussion by expelling religious sectarian 'expertise'. The challenge of the present is, in part, to deal with the claims of non-religious experts to cognitive authority. There is no formula for meeting this challenge. But there is a process of legitimation and delegitimation. And it should be no surprise that this process has come to occupy more of public discourse than ever before. But the very vigour of discussion, and the ability of the public to make decisions about what claims are legitimate, belies the image of the liberal public as victim. Is this enough? Or is there a higher standard of proper public delibera­tion to which public acceptance of expert claims ought to be held? Anti-liberals, following the arguments of Habermas and Foucault, have gen­erally said that it is not enough. For them, it is precisely the point of the critique of expertise to show how our forms of reasoning in public deliberation are preconditioned by unchallenged and, practically speaking, unchallengeable forming assumptions that derive from experts.7 The kind of social constructionism that has been practised in much of science studies is different in character, and has different implications, for it is concerned not with showing that some forms of discussion involve social construction and others do not, but with showing that even science has this character. As I have suggested, to the extent that it has been concerned with establishing the conventional and mutable character of many of the distinctions that philosophers of science have attempted to absolutize, that is to say to make scientists less immaculate and more like plumbers, social constructionism parallels a moment in liberal theory. The moment is the one at which it was recognized that the history of liberalism is a matter of 'continuation by other means', in which the 'foundations' of actual liberal democracies are conventions, custom, flexibly applied and typically somewhat vague 'principles' rather than rigid doctrines or acts of faith. A corollary recognition to this political realization is that despite being mutable and shifting, conventions have sufficed to preserve what Schmitt ([1926] 1985: 5) characterized as the real possibility of'persuad­ing one's opponents through argument of the truth or justice of something, or allowing oneself to be persuaded of something as true or just'. The parallel claim that what counts as 'expert' is conventional, muta­ble and shifting, and that people are persuaded of claims to expertise through mutable, shifting conventions does not make the decisions to accept or reject the authority of experts less than reasonable in the sense appropriate to liberal discussion. To grant a role to expert knowledge does not require us to accept the immaculate conception of expertise. The lesson of the second kind of social constructionism is that these conditions, the conditions of mutability - and not some sort of analogue to Haber-mas's ideal-speech situation - are the conditions under which scientific consensus itself occurs, and that there is no alternative. This is a negative message, but nevertheless an important one, in that it excludes a certain kind of utopianism about expertise and its 'control' by some sort of higher reason. Excluding this kind of utopianism is a kind of answer to the issues with which we began. Expertise is a deep problem for liberal theory only if we imagine that there is some sort of standard of higher reason against which the banal process of judging experts as plumbers can be held, and if there is not, it is a deep problem for democratic theory only if this banal process is beyond the capacity of ordinary people.

#### Turn – moral absolutism – moral opposition to intervention is a bankrupt ethic – evaluating consequences of non-intervention is necessary

Isaac 2

Professor of Political Science at Indiana-Bloomington, Director of the Center for the Study of Democracy and Public Life, PhD from Yale (Jeffery C., Dissent Magazine, Vol. 49, Iss. 2, “Ends, Means, and Politics,” p. Proquest)

As a result, the most important political questions are simply not asked. It is assumed that U.S. military intervention is an act of "aggression," but no consideration is given to the aggression to which intervention is a response. The status quo ante in Afghanistan is not, as peace activists would have it, peace, but rather terrorist violence abetted by a regime--the Taliban--that rose to power through brutality and repression. This requires us to ask a question that most "peace" activists would prefer not to ask: What should be done to respond to the violence of a Saddam Hussein, or a Milosevic, or a Taliban regime? What means are likely to stop violence and bring criminals to justice? Calls for diplomacy and international law are well intended and important; they implicate a decent and civilized ethic of global order. But they are also vague and empty, because they are not accompanied by any account of how diplomacy or international law can work effectively to address the problem at hand. The campus left offers no such account. To do so would require it to contemplate tragic choices in which moral goodness is of limited utility. Here what matters is not purity of intention but the intelligent exercise of power. Power is not a dirty word or an unfortunate feature of the world. It is the core of politics. Power is the ability to effect outcomes in the world. Politics, in large part, involves contests over the distribution and use of power. To accomplish anything in the political world, one must attend to the means that are necessary to bring it about. And to develop such means is to develop, and to exercise, power. To say this is not to say that power is beyond morality. It is to say that power is not reducible to morality. As writers such as Niccolo Machiavelli, Max Weber, Reinhold Niebuhr, and Hannah Arendt have taught, an unyielding concern with moral goodness undercuts political responsibility. The concern may be morally laudable, reflecting a kind of personal integrity, but it suffers from three fatal flaws: (1) It fails to see that the purity of one's intention does not ensure the achievement of what one intends. Abjuring violence or refusing to make common cause with morally compromised parties may seem like the right thing; but if such tactics entail impotence, then it is hard to view them as serving any moral good beyond the clean conscience of their supporters; (2) it fails to see that in a world of real violence and injustice, moral purity is not simply a form of powerlessness; it is often a form of complicity in injustice. This is why, from the standpoint of politics--as opposed to religion--pacifism is always a potentially immoral stand. In categorically repudiating violence, it refuses in principle to oppose certain violent injustices with any effect; and (3) it fails to see that politics is as much about unintended consequences as it is about intentions; it is the effects of action, rather than the motives of action, that is most significant. Just as the alignment with "good" may engender impotence, it is often the pursuit of "good" that generates evil. This is the lesson of communism in the twentieth century: it is not enough that one's goals be sincere or idealistic; it is equally important, always, to ask about the effects of pursuing these goals and to judge these effects in pragmatic and historically contextualized ways. Moral absolutism inhibits this judgment. It alienates those who are not true believers. It promotes arrogance. And it undermines political effectiveness.

# 2NC

## FW

#### Absent questions of engagement with existing institutions their aff is useless – individual change is overshadowed by dominant structures

Wight – Professor of IR @ University of Sydney – 6

(Colin, Agents, Structures and International Relations: Politics as Ontology, pgs. 48-50

One important aspect of this relational ontology is that these relations constitute our identity as social actors. According to this relational model of societies, one is what one is, by virtue of the relations within which one is embedded. A worker is only a worker by virtue of his/her relationship to his/her employer and vice versa. ‘Our social being is constituted by relations and our social acts presuppose them.’ At any particular moment in time an individual may be implicated in all manner of relations, each exerting its own peculiar causal effects. This ‘lattice-work’ of relations constitutes the structure of particular societies and endures despite changes in the individuals occupying them. Thus, the relations, the structures, are ontologically distinct from the individuals who enter into them. At a minimum, the social sciences are concerned with two distinct, although mutually interdependent, strata. There is an ontological difference between people and structures: ‘people are not relations, societies are not conscious agents’. Any attempt to explain one in terms of the other should be rejected. If there is an ontological difference between society and people, however, we need to elaborate on the relationship between them. Bhaskar argues that we need a system of mediating concepts, encompassing both aspects of the duality of praxis into which active subjects must fit in order to reproduce it: that is, a system of concepts designating the ‘point of contact’ between human agency and social structures. This is known as a ‘positioned practice’ system. In many respects, the idea of ‘positioned practice’ is very similar to Pierre Bourdieu’s notion of *habitus*. Bourdieu is primarily concerned with what individuals do in their daily lives. He is keen to refute the idea that social activity can be understood solely in terms of individual decision-making, or as determined by surpa-individual objective structures. Bourdieu’s notion of the *habitus* can be viewed as a bridge-building exercise across the explanatory gap between two extremes. Importantly, the notion of a habitus can only be understood in relation to the concept of a ‘social field’. According to Bourdieu, a social field is ‘a network, or a configuration, of objective relations between positions objectively defined’. A social field, then, refers to a structured system of social positions occupied by individuals and/or institutions – the nature of which defines the situation for their occupants. This is a social field whose form is constituted in terms of the relations which define it as a field of a certain type. A *habitus* (positioned practices) is a mediating link between individuals’ subjective worlds and the socio-cultural world into which they are born and which they share with others. The power of the habitus derives from the thoughtlessness of habit and habituation, rather than consciously learned rules. The habitus is imprinted and encoded in a socializing process that commences during early childhood. It is inculcated more by experience than by explicit teaching. Socially competent performances are produced as a matter of routine, without explicit reference to a body of codified knowledge, and without the actors necessarily knowing what they are doing (in the sense of being able adequately to explain what they are doing). As such, the *habitus* can be seen as the site of ‘internalization of reality and the externalization of internality.’ Thus social practices are produced in, and by, the encounter between: (1) the *habitus* and its dispositions; (2) the constraints and demands of the socio-cultural field to which the habitus is appropriate or within; and (3) the dispositions of the individual agents located within both the socio-cultural field and the *habitus*. When placed within Bhaskar’s stratified complex social ontology the model we have is as depicted in Figure 1. The explanation of practices will require all three levels. Society, as field of relations, exists prior to, and is independent of, individual and collective understandings at any particular moment in time; that is, social action requires the conditions for action. Likewise, given that behavior is seemingly recurrent, patterned, ordered, institutionalised, and displays a degree of stability over time, there must be sets of relations and rules that govern it. Contrary to individualist theory, these relations, rules and roles are not dependent upon either knowledge of them by particular individuals, or the existence of actions by particular individuals; that is, their explanation cannot be reduced to consciousness or to the attributes of individuals. These emergent social forms must possess emergent powers. This leads on to arguments for the reality of society based on a causal criterion. Society, as opposed to the individuals that constitute it, is, as Foucault has put it, ‘a complex and independent reality that has its own laws and mechanisms of reaction, its regulations as well as its possibility of disturbance. This new reality is society…It becomes necessary to reflect upon it, upon its specific characteristics, its constants and its variables’.

#### Participating in organizations checks impulses to care about short-term personal issues

Cole 2011 - Professor, Georgetown University Law Center (Winter, David, “WHERE LIBERTY LIES: CIVIL SOCIETY AND INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AFTER 9/11,” 57 Wayne L. Rev. 1203, Lexis)

But the engagement that "civil society constitutionalism" identifies as essential has a more particular focus, on constitutionalism itself. Groups like the ACLU, the Center for Constitutional Rights, and the Bill of Rights Defense Committee are defined by their commitment to such rights. But they are only the most obvious opportunities for engagement. Civil society offers a broad range of ways in which individuals may become involved in constitutional discourse--by attending lectures or demonstrations; participating in ad hoc groups focused on issues of rights; writing letters to the editor, blogs, or op-eds; teaching one's children; or debating with one's neighbors. There are an almost infinite variety of ways to engage with constitutionalism. But organized collective endeavors, with existing rights groups or through the creation of new ones, are probably the most effective. Joining a group defined by its commitment to constitutional and human rights is itself a check on one's own temptations to short-circuit rights, or to waver in one's attention or commitment to rights. The collective not only magnifies the impact that an individual might have, but also helps to hold individuals to their commitments. Thus, "civil society constitutionalism" is not just a direction for scholarship, or a justification for constitutional doctrine, but a pragmatic directive to citizens: get involved in the defense of your Constitution, or you may find it wanting when it is needed most.

#### Even if < their topic > is important to talk about, a controversial policy statement must be the starting point for discussion – That focus is the internal link to all our decision-making impact AND turns the aff – Without striving towards concrete solutions, we are just spitting into the wind

Austin J. Freeley and David L. Steinberg – John Carroll University / U Miami – 2009, Argumentation and Debate: Critical Thinking for Reasoned Decision Making, p. 4-5, googlebooks

Debate is a means of settling differences, so there must be a difference of opinion or a conflict of interest before there can be a debate. If everyone is in agreement on a tact or value or policy, there is no need for debate: the matter can be settled by unanimous consent. Thus, for example, it would be pointless to attempt to debate "Resolved: That two plus two equals four," because there is simply no controversy about this statement. (Controversy is an essential prerequisite of debate. Where there is no clash of ideas, proposals, interests, or expressed positions on issues, there is no debate. In addition, debate cannot produce effective decisions without clear identification of a question or questions to be answered. For example, general argument may occur about the broad topic of illegal immigration. How many illegal immigrants are in the United States? What is the impact of illegal immigration and immigrants on our economy? What is their impact on our communities? Do they commit crimes? Do they take jobs from American workers? Do they pay taxes? Do they require social services? Is it a problem that some do not speak English? Is it the responsibility of employers to discourage illegal immigration by not hiring undocumented workers? Should they have the opportunity to gain citizenship? Does illegal immigration pose a security threat to our country? Do illegal immigrants do work that American workers are unwilling to do? Are their rights as workers and as human beings at risk due to their status? Are they abused by employers, law enforcement, housing, and businesses? How are their families impacted by their status? What is the moral and philosophical obligation of a nation state to maintain its borders? Should we build a wall on the Mexican border, establish a national identification card, or enforce existing laws against employers? Should we invite immigrants to become U.S. citizens? Surely you can think of many more concerns to be addressed by a conversation about the topic area of illegal immigration. Participation in this "debate" is likely to be emotional and intense. However, it is not likely to be productive or useful without focus on a particular question and identification of a line demarcating sides in the controversy. To be discussed and resolved effectively, controversies must be stated clearly. Vague understanding results in unfocused deliberation and poor decisions, frustration, and emotional distress, as evidenced by the failure of the United States Congress to make progress on the immigration debate during the summer of 2007.¶ Someone disturbed by the problem of the growing underclass of poorly educated, socially disenfranchised youths might observe, "Public schools are doing a terrible job! They are overcrowded, and many teachers are poorly qualified in their subject areas. Even the best teachers can do little more than struggle to maintain order in their classrooms." That same concerned citizen, facing a complex range of issues, might arrive at an unhelpful decision, such as "We ought to do something about this" or, worse, "It's too complicated a problem to deal with." Groups of concerned citizens worried about the state of public education could join together to express their frustrations, anger, disillusionment, and emotions regarding the schools, but without a focus for their discussions, they could easily agree about the sorry state of education without finding points of clarity or potential solutions. A gripe session would follow. But if a precise question is posed—such as "What can be done to improve public education?"—then a more profitable area of discussion is opened up simply by placing a focus on the search for a concrete solution step. One or more judgments can be phrased in the form of debate propositions, motions for parliamentary debate, or bills for legislative assemblies. The statements "Resolved: That the federal government should implement a program of charter schools in at-risk communities" and "Resolved: That the state of Florida should adopt a school voucher program" more clearly identify specific ways of dealing with educational problems in a manageable form, suitable for debate. They provide specific policies to be investigated and aid discussants in identifying points of difference.¶ To have a productive debate, which facilitates effective decision making by directing and placing limits on the decision to be made, the basis for argument should be clearly defined. If we merely talk about "homelessness" or "abortion" or "crime” or "global warming" we are likely to have an interesting discussion but not to establish profitable basis for argument. For example, the statement "Resolved: That the pen is mightier than the sword" is debatable, yet fails to provide much basis for clear argumentation. If we take this statement to mean that the written word is more effective than physical force for some purposes, we can identify a problem area: the comparative effectiveness of writing or physical force for a specific purpose.

Although we now have a general subject, we have not yet stated a problem. It is still too broad, too loosely worded to promote well-organized argument. What sort of writing are we concerned with—poems, novels, government documents, website development, advertising, or what? What does "effectiveness" mean in this context? What kind of physical force is being compared—fists, dueling swords, bazookas, nuclear weapons, or what? A more specific question might be. "Would a mutual defense treaty or a visit by our fleet be more effective in assuring Liurania of our support in a certain crisis?" The basis for argument could be phrased in a debate proposition such as "Resolved: That the United States should enter into a mutual defense treatv with Laurania." Negative advocates might oppose this proposition by arguing that fleet maneuvers would be a better solution. This is not to say that debates should completely avoid creative interpretation of the controversy by advocates, or that good debates cannot occur over competing interpretations of the controversy; in fact, these sorts of debates may be very engaging. The point is that debate is best facilitated by the guidance provided by focus on a particular point of difference, which will be outlined in the following discussion.

**Engaging policy is key**

**McClean**, **Professor – Philosophy, Rutgers**, **1**

**(THE CULTURAL LEFT AND THE LIMITS OF SOCIAL HOPE, http://www.american-philosophy.org/archives/2001%20Conference/Discussion%20papers/david\_mcclean.htm)**

Leftist American culture critics might put their considerable talents to better use if they bury some of their cynicism about America's social and political prospects and help forge public and political possibilities in a spirit of determination to, indeed, achieve our country - the country of Jefferson and King; the country of John Dewey and Malcom X; the country of Franklin Roosevelt and Bayard Rustin, and of the later George Wallace and the later Barry Goldwater. To invoke the words of King, and with reference to the American society, the time is always ripe to seize the opportunity to help create the "beloved community," one woven with the thread of agape into a conceptually single yet diverse tapestry that shoots for nothing less than a true intra-American cosmopolitan ethos, one wherein both same sex unions and faith-based initiatives will be able to be part of the same social reality, one wherein business interests and the university are not seen as belonging to two separate galaxies but as part of the same answer to the threat of social and ethical nihilism. We who fancy ourselves philosophers would do well to create from within ourselves and from within our ranks a new kind of public intellectual who has both a hungry theoretical mind and who is yet capable of seeing the need to move past high theory to other important questions that are less bedazzling and "interesting" but more important to the prospect of our flourishing - questions such as "How is it possible to develop a citizenry that cherishes a certain hexis, one which prizes the character of the Samaritan on the road to Jericho almost more than any other?" or "How can we square the political dogma that undergirds the fantasy of a missile defense system with the need to treat America as but one member in a community of nations under a "law of peoples?"The new public philosopher might seek to understand labor law and military and trade theory and doctrine as much as theories of surplus value; the logic of international markets and trade agreements as much as critiques of commodification, and the politics of complexity as much as the politics of power (all of which can still be done from our arm chairs.) This means going down deep into the guts of our quotidian social institutions, into the **grimy pragmatic details** where intellectuals are loathe to dwell but where the officers and bureaucrats of those institutions take difficult and often unpleasant, imperfect decisions that affect other peoples' lives, and **it means making honest attempts to truly understand how those institutions actually function in the actual world before howling for their overthrow commences. This might help keep us from being slapped down in debates by true policy pros who actually know what they are talking about** but who lack awareness of the dogmatic assumptions from which they proceed, and who have not yet found a good reason to listen to jargon-riddled lectures from philosophers and culture critics with their snobish disrespect for the so-called "managerial class."

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Some facts need to be taken for granted in order for there to be genuine political discussion, and some of the work of establish­ing the facts is, properly, delegated to experts. Indeed, to imagine a world in which such delegation did not occur would be to imagine a simpler society, at best a society of Jeffersonian yeomen, in which everyone knew pretty much what everyone else knew that was relevant to public decision­making. To preserve the possibility of political discussion that such societies established, it is essential to delegate to experts and grant them cognitive authority. But granting them cognitive authority is not the same as grant­ing them some sort of absolute and unquestionable power over us. The fact that expertise goes through a process of legitimation also means that legitimacy may be withdrawn and the cognitive authority of experts may collapse, and this suggests something quite different than the idea that liberalism is a kind of self-contradiction, and also something much more interesting. We, the non-experts, decide whether claims to cognitive au­thority, which in political terms are requests to have their conclusions treated as neutral fact, are to be honoured. And we have, historically, changed our minds about who is 'expert', and what is to be treated as neutral fact. This is, so to speak, a 'liberal' argument about expertise. It grants that cognitive authority and the acceptance of expertise, in modern conditions, is a condition of genuine public discourse. Liberalism, in the form of the principle of neutrality, is a means to the end of the creation of the conditions for public discourse. 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As I have suggested, to the extent that it has been concerned with establishing the conventional and mutable character of many of the distinctions that philosophers of science have attempted to absolutize, that is to say to make scientists less immaculate and more like plumbers, social constructionism parallels a moment in liberal theory. The moment is the one at which it was recognized that the history of liberalism is a matter of 'continuation by other means', in which the 'foundations' of actual liberal democracies are conventions, custom, flexibly applied and typically somewhat vague 'principles' rather than rigid doctrines or acts of faith. A corollary recognition to this political realization is that despite being mutable and shifting, conventions have sufficed to preserve what Schmitt ([1926] 1985: 5) characterized as the real possibility of'persuad­ing one's opponents through argument of the truth or justice of something, or allowing oneself to be persuaded of something as true or just'. The parallel claim that what counts as 'expert' is conventional, muta­ble and shifting, and that people are persuaded of claims to expertise through mutable, shifting conventions does not make the decisions to accept or reject the authority of experts less than reasonable in the sense appropriate to liberal discussion. To grant a role to expert knowledge does not require us to accept the immaculate conception of expertise. The lesson of the second kind of social constructionism is that these conditions, the conditions of mutability - and not some sort of analogue to Haber-mas's ideal-speech situation - are the conditions under which scientific consensus itself occurs, and that there is no alternative. This is a negative message, but nevertheless an important one, in that it excludes a certain kind of utopianism about expertise and its 'control' by some sort of higher reason. Excluding this kind of utopianism is a kind of answer to the issues with which we began. Expertise is a deep problem for liberal theory only if we imagine that there is some sort of standard of higher reason against which the banal process of judging experts as plumbers can be held, and if there is not, it is a deep problem for democratic theory only if this banal process is beyond the capacity of ordinary people.

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## DA

### AT: Epist

#### Method focus is useless and devolves into paradigm wars

Wendt, Professor – International Security – Ohio State, 98

(Alexander, “On Constitution and Causation in International Relations,” British International Studies Association)

As a community, we in the academic study of international politics spend too much time worrying about the kind of issues addressed in this essay. The central point of IR scholarship is to increase our knowledge of how the world works, not to worry about how (or whether) we can know how the world works. What matters for IR is ontology, not epistemology. This doesn’t mean that there are no interesting epistemological questions in IR, and even less does it mean that there are no important political or sociological aspects to those questions. Indeed there are, as I have suggested above, and as a discipline IR should have more awareness of these aspects. At the same time, however, these are questions best addressed by philosophers and sociologists of knowledge, not political scientists. Let’s face it: most IR scholars, including this one, have little or no proper training in epistemology, and as such the attempt to solve epistemological problems anyway will inevitably lead to confusion (after all, after 2000 years, even the specialists are still having a hard time). Moreover, as long as we let our research be driven in an open-minded fashion by substantive questions and problems rather than by epistemologies and methods, there is little need to answer epistemological questions either. It is simply not the case that we have to undertake an epistemological analysis of how we can know something before we can know it, a fact amply attested to by the success of the natural sciences, whose practitioners are only rarely forced by the results of their inquiries to consider epistemological questions. In important respects we do know how international politics works, and it doesn’t much matter how we came to that knowledge. In that light, going into the epistemology business will distract us from the real business of IR, which is international politics. Our great debates should be about first-order issues of substance, like the ‘first debate’ between Realists and Idealists, not second-order issues of method. Unfortunately, it is no longer a simple matter for IR scholars to ‘just say no’ to epistemological discourse. The problem is that this discourse has already contaminated our thinking about international politics, helping to polarize the discipline into ‘paradigm wars’. Although the resurgence of these wars in the 1980s and 90s is due in large part to the rise of post-positivism, its roots lie in the epistemological anxiety of positivists, who since the 1950s have been very concerned to establish the authority of their work as Science. This is an important goal, one that I share, but its implementation has been marred by an overly narrow conception of science as being concerned only with causal questions that can be answered using the methods of natural science. The effect has been to marginalize historical and interpretive work that does not fit this mould, and to encourage scholars interested in that kind of work to see themselves as somehow not engaged in science. One has to wonder whether the two sides should be happy with the result. Do positivists really mean to suggest that it is not part of science to ask questions about how things are constituted, questions which if those things happen to be made of ideas might only be answerable by interpretive methods? If so, then they seem to be saying that the double-helix model of DNA, and perhaps much of rational choice theory, is not science. And do post-positivists really mean to suggest that students of social life should not ask causal questions or attempt to test their claims against empirical evidence? If so, then it is not clear by what criteria their work should be judged, or how it differs from art or revelation. On both sides, in other words, the result of the Third Debate’s sparring over epistemology is often one-sided, intolerant caricatures of science.

### AT: Imperialism

#### The alternative collapses into neoconservative globalism – strategic and focused interventions solves. Ideal absolutism or retreat culminates in extinction.

Krauthammer 4 – Charles is a Pulitzer Prize–winning syndicated columnist, political commentator, and research fellow at a variety of think tanks. “In Defense of Democratic Realism,” The National Interest, Fall 2004; 77, http://people.cas.sc.edu/rosati/krauthammer.demrealism.ni.f04.htm

On February 10, 2004, I delivered the Irving Kristol Lecture to the American Enterprise Institute outlining a theory of foreign policy that I called democratic realism. It was premised on the notion that the 1990s were a holiday from history, an illusory period during which we imagined that the existential struggles of the past six decades against the various totalitarianisms had ended for good. September 11 reminded us rudely that history had not ended, and we found ourselves in a new existential struggle, this time with an enemy even more fanatical, fatalistic and indeed undeterable than in the past. Nonetheless, we had one factor in our favor. With the passing of the Soviet Union, we had entered a unique period in human history, a unipolar era in which America enjoys a predominance of power greater than any that has existed in the half-millennium of the modern state system. The challenge of the new age is whether we can harness that unipolar power to confront the new challenge, or whether we rely, as we did for the first decade of the post-Cold War era, on the vague internationalism that characterizes the foreign policy thinking of European elites and American liberalism. The speech and the subsequent AEI monograph1 have occasioned some comment. None, however, as loquacious as Frank Fukuyama's twelve-page rebuttal in the previous issue of The National Interest. His essay is doubly useful. It is a probing critique of democratic realism, yet demonstrates inadvertently how little the critics have to offer as an alternative. Democratic Realism In my speech I describe the four major schools of American foreign policy. Isolationism defines the American national interest extremely narrowly and essentially wishes to pull up the drawbridge to Fortress America. Unfortunately, in the age of the supersonic jet, the submarine and the ballistic missile, to say nothing of the suitcase bomb, the fortress has no moat, and the drawbridge, as was demonstrated on 9/11, cannot be drawn up. Isolationism has a long pedigree, but today it is a theory of nostalgia and reaction. It is as defunct post-9/11 as it was on December 11, 1941, the day the America First Committee disbanded. More important is liberal internationalism, the dominant school of American liberalism and of the foreign policy establishment. Its pillars are (a) legalism, the construction of a web of treaties and agreements that will bind the international community in a normative web; (b) multilateralism, acting in concert with other countries in pursuit of "international legitimacy"; and (c) humanitarianism, a deep suspicion of national interest as a justification for projecting power--hence the congressional Democrats' overwhelming 1991 vote against the Gulf War, followed by a Democratic administration that launched humanitarian military interventions in Haiti, Bosnia and Kosovo. Liberal internationalists see national interest as a form of communal selfishness and thus as inimical to their true objective: the construction of a new international system that mimics domestic society, being based on law, treaties, covenants, understandings and norms that will ultimately abolish power politics. To do so, liberal internationalism is prepared to yield America's unique unipolar power piece by piece by subsuming it into the new global architecture in which America becomes not the arbiter of international events but a good and tame international citizen. The third school, realism, emphasizes the primacy of power in international relations. It recognizes that the international system is a Hobbesian state of nature, not to be confused with the settled order of domestic society that enjoys a community of values, a monopoly of power, and most important, an enforcer of norms--all of which are lacking in the international system. Realism has no use for a liberal internationalism that serves only to divert the United States from its real tasks. The United States spent the 1990s, for example, endlessly negotiating treaties on the spread of WMD, which would have had absolutely no effect on the very terrorists and rogue states that are trying to get their hands on these weapons. Realism has the virtue of most clearly understanding the new unipolarity and its uses, including the unilateral and pre-emptive use of power if necessary. But in the end, pure realism in any American context fails because it offers no vision beyond power. It is all means and no ends. It will not play in a country that was built on a proposition and that sees itself as the carrier of the democratic idea. Hence, the fourth school, democratic globalism, often incorrectly called neoconservatism. It sees the spread of democracy, "the success of liberty", as John F. Kennedy put it in his inaugural address, as both the ends and the means of foreign policy. Its most public spokesmen, George W. Bush and Tony Blair, have sought to rally America and the world to a struggle over values. Its response to 9/11 is to engage in a War on Terror whose essential element is the global spread of democracy. Democratic globalism is an improvement on realism because it understands the utility of democracy as a means for achieving global safety and security. Realists undervalue internal democratic structures. They see the state system as an arena of colliding billiard balls. Realists have little interest in what is inside. Democratic globalists understand that as a rule, fellow democracies provide the most secure alliances and most stable relationships. Therefore the spread of democracy--understood not just as elections, but as limited government, protection of minorities, individual rights, the rule of law and open economies--has ultimately not just moral but geopolitical value. The problem with democratic globalism, as I argued in my address, is that it is too ambitious and too idealistic. The notion, expressed by Tony Blair, that "the spread of freedom is . . . our last line of defense and our first line of attack" is a bridge too far. "The danger of democratic globalism", I wrote, "is its universalism, its open-ended commitment to human freedom, its temptation to plant the flag of democracy everywhere." Such a worldwide crusade would overstretch our resources, exhaust our morale and distract us from our central challenge. I therefore suggested an alternative, democratic realism, that is "targeted, focused and limited", that intervenes not everywhere that freedom is threatened but only where it counts--in those regions where the defense or advancement of freedom is critical to success in the larger war against the existential enemy. That is how we fought the Cold War. The existential enemy then was Soviet communism. Today, it is Arab/Islamic radicalism. Therefore "where it really counts today is in that Islamic crescent stretching from North Africa to Afghanistan." An Existential Threat At its most fundamental, Fukuyama's critique is that I am misreading the new world because there is no existential struggle. By calling our war with Arab/Islamic radicalism existential, I exaggerate the threat and thus distort the whole fabric of American foreign policy. "Krauthammer", he writes, "speaks of the United States as being in the midst of a bitter and remorseless war with an implacable enemy that is out to destroy Western civilization." "Speaks of"--as one might speak of flying saucers. In reality, asserts Fukuyama, "Al-Qaeda and other radical Islamist groups aspire to be existential threats to American civilization but do not currently have anything like the capacity to actualize their vision." Fukuyama apparently believes that the phrase "not currently" saves him from existential peril. But the problem is that precisely as we speak, Al-Qaeda is energetically trying to make up for the deficiencies from which Fukuyama so complacently derives comfort. When Hitler marched into the Rhineland in 1936, he did not "currently" have the means to overrun Europe. Many Europeans believed, delusionally, that he did not present an existential threat. By Fukuyama's logic, they were right. What defines an existential threat is intent, objective and potential capability. Existential struggle is a struggle over existence and identity. Until it lost heart late in life, Soviet communism was utterly committed to the eradication of what it called capitalism, in other words, the entire way of life of the West. Its mission was to do to the world what it had done to, say, Lithuania and Czechoslovakia--remake it in its image. Existential struggle is a fight to the end--extermination or, even better, conversion. That is what distinguishes it from non-existential struggles, in which the contending parties in principle can find compromise (over territory or resources or power). Fukuyama is unimpressed with radical Islam because, in his view, it lacks the global appeal of such true existential threats as communism and Nazism. But Nazism had little global appeal. A master-race theory hardly plays well among the other races. Did it really have more sympathizers and fifth columnists in the West than does Islamism today? Islamist cells are being discovered regularly in just about every European capital, and some even in the United States. And these, of course, are just the fifth columnists we know about. The thought is sobering, given how oblivious we were to the presence among us of the 9/11 plotters. Just because Islamism in the West may not, like its Nazi or communist counterparts, take the form of a political party or capture Western celebrity intellectuals, does not minimize the threat or the power of its appeal. Radical Islam does not have its Sartre or its Pound. It is the conceit of intellectuals to think that this counts for more than a Richard Reid, armed this time not with a shoe-bomb but a nuclear suitcase or consignment of anthrax. Disdaining the appeal of radical Islam is the conceit also of secularists. Radical Islam is not just as fanatical and unappeasable in its anti-Americanism, anti-Westernism and anti-modernism as anything we have ever known. It has the distinct advantage of being grounded in a venerable religion of over one billion adherents that not only provides a ready supply of recruits--trained and readied in mosques and madrassas far more effective, autonomous and ubiquitous than any Hitler Youth or Komsomol camp--but is able to draw on a long and deep tradition of zeal, messianic expectation and a cult of martyrdom. Hitler and Stalin had to invent these out of whole cloth. Mussolini's version was a parody. Islamic radicalism flies under a flag with far more historical depth and enduring appeal than the ersatz religions of the swastika and hammer-and-sickle that proved so historically thin and insubstantial. Fukuyama does not just underestimate the power of religion. He underestimates the power of technology. He is trapped in the notion that only Great Powers can threaten other Great Powers. Because the enemy today does not resemble a Germany or a Japan, the threat is "of a lesser order of magnitude." For a realist, he is remarkably blind to the revolution that technology has brought. The discovery of nuclear power is the greatest "order of magnitude" leap in potential destructiveness since the discovery of fire. True, the atomic bomb was detonated half a century ago; but the democratization of the knowledge of how to make it is new. Chemical and biological weapons are perhaps a century old; but the diffusion of the capacity to develop them is new. Radical Islam's obvious intent is to decapitate the American polity, cripple its economy and create general devastation. We have seen what a mere 19 Islamists can do in the absence of WMD We have seen what but two envelopes of mail-delivered anthrax can do to the world's most powerful capital. Imagine what a dozen innocuous vans in a dozen American cities dispersing aerosolized anthrax could do. Imagine what just a handful of the world's loose nukes, detonated simultaneously in New York, Washington, Chicago and just a few other cities, would do to the United States. America would still exist on the map. But what kind of country--and what kind of polity--would be left? If that is not an existential threat, nothing is.

## Case

### Util

**Util**

**Johnson, 85** Associate Professor of Philosophy and Acting Chairman of the Philosophy Department, University of Maryland at College Park (Conrad D., “The authority of the moral agent” p. 391-392)

Recent moral philosophy shows much interest in the problem of how deontological constraints are to be reconciled with consequentialism. On the one hand, there is the intuition that there are certain things it is simply wrong for an individual to do even if violating the prohibitions would produce better consequences. On the other hand, moral prohibitions themselves are not above critical scrutiny, and, when we turn to this enterprise, consequentialism broadly conceived has a powerful claim; for how else are we to evaluate and possibly revise our conception of morally right behavior if not by reflecting on the consequences? Trouble develops when we try to reconcile deontological intuitions with consequentialist insights. Some versions of rule utilitarianism have seemed promising at first, but dissatisfaction returns when we try to give a careful explanation of the relationship between the rules that are utilitarianly justified and the particular action that one is called upon to do. When it is absolutely clear to the agent in a particular case that following the rule will have some consequences than breaking it, even though the rule is in general the best, is it morally right to break the rule? If the rule is conceived as merely cautionary and simplifying, then there is no argument against bypassing it in a particular case in which the situation is wholly clear and the calculation has already taken place was unnecessary. On the other hand, if the rule is conceived as having some independent authority, then what is the nature of this independent authority? The rule-bound or superstitious person might adhere to the rule for its own sake, but the rational person would not. If we follow the usual deontological connection, there are also well-known difficulties. If it is simply wrong to kill the innocent, the wrongness must in some way be connected to the consequences. *That* an innocent person is killed must be a consequence that has some important bearing on the wrongness of the action; else why be so concerned about the killing of an innocent? Further, if it is wrong in certain cases for the agent to weigh the consequences in deciding whether to kill or break a promise, it is hard to deny that this has some connection to the consequences. Following this line of thought, it is consequentialist considerations of mistrust that stand behind such restrictions on what the agent may take into account.

**Not racialized**

**Isaac 02** (Professor of Political Science at Indiana-Bloomington, Director of the Center for the Study of Democracy and Public Life, PhD from Yale, Jeffery C., Dissent Magazine, Vol. 49, Iss. 2, “Ends, Means, and Politics,” p. Proquest)

As a result, the most important political questions are simply not asked. It is assumed that U.S. military intervention is an act of "aggression," but no consideration is given to the aggression to which intervention is a response. The status quo ante in Afghanistan is not, as peace activists would have it, peace, but rather terrorist violence abetted by a regime--the Taliban--that rose to power through brutality and repression. This requires us to ask a question that most "peace" activists would prefer not to ask: What should be done to respond to the violence of a Saddam Hussein, or a Milosevic, or a Taliban regime? What means are likely to stop violence and bring criminals to justice? Calls for diplomacy and international law are well intended and important; they implicate a decent and civilized ethic of global order. But they are also vague and empty, because they are not accompanied by any account of how diplomacy or international law can work effectively to address the problem at hand. The campus left offers no such account. To do so would require it to contemplate tragic choices in which moral goodness is of limited utility. Here what matters is not purity of intention but the intelligent exercise of power. Power is not a dirty word or an unfortunate feature of the world. It is the core of politics. Power is the ability to effect outcomes in the world. Politics, in large part, involves contests over the distribution and use of power. To accomplish anything in the political world, one must attend to the means that are necessary to bring it about. And to develop such means is to develop, and to exercise, power. To say this is not to say that power is beyond morality. It is to say that power is not reducible to morality. As writers such as Niccolo Machiavelli, Max Weber, Reinhold Niebuhr, and Hannah Arendt have taught, an unyielding concern with moral goodness undercuts political responsibility. The concern may be morally laudable, reflecting a kind of personal integrity, but it suffers from three fatal flaws: (1) It fails to see that the purity of one's intention does not ensure the achievement of what one intends. Abjuring violence or refusing to make common cause with morally compromised parties may seem like the right thing; but if such tactics entail impotence, then it is hard to view them as serving any moral good beyond the clean conscience of their supporters; (2) it fails to see that in a world of real violence and injustice, moral purity is not simply a form of powerlessness; it is often a form of complicity in injustice. This is why, from the standpoint of politics--as opposed to religion--pacifism is always a potentially immoral stand. In categorically repudiating violence, it refuses in principle to oppose certain violent injustices with any effect; and (3) it fails to see that politics is as much about unintended consequences as it is about intentions; it is the effects of action, rather than the motives of action, that is most significant. Just as the alignment with "good" may engender impotence, it is often the pursuit of "good" that generates evil. This is the lesson of communism in the twentieth century: it is not enough that one's goals be sincere or idealistic; it is equally important, always, to ask about the effects of pursuing these goals and to judge these effects in pragmatic and historically contextualized ways. Moral absolutism inhibits this judgment. It alienates those who are not true believers. It promotes arrogance. And it undermines political effectiveness.

**Util’s inevitable even under deont**

**Green 02** (Assistant Professor Department of Psychology Harvard University, Joshua, November 2002 "The Terrible, Horrible, No Good, Very Bad Truth About Morality And What To Do About It", 314)

Some people who talk of balancing rights may think there is an algorithm for deciding which rights take priority over which. If that’s what we mean by 302 “balancing rights,” then we are wise to shun this sort of talk. Attempting to solve moral problems using a complex deontological algorithm is dogmatism at its most esoteric, but dogmatism all the same. However, it’s likely that when some people talk about “balancing competing rights and obligations” they are already thinking like consequentialists in spite of their use of deontological language. Once again, what deontological language does best is express the thoughts of people struck by strong, emotional moral intuitions: “It doesn’t matter that you can save five people by pushing him to his death. To do this would be a violation of his rights!”19 That is why angry protesters say things like, “Animals Have Rights, Too!” rather than, “Animal Testing: The Harms Outweigh the Benefits!” Once again, rights talk captures the apparent clarity of the issue and absoluteness of the answer. But sometimes rights talk persists long after the sense of clarity and absoluteness has faded. One thinks, for example, of the thousands of children whose lives are saved by drugs that were tested on animals and the “rights” of those children. One finds oneself balancing the “rights” on both sides by asking how many rabbit lives one is willing to sacrifice in order to save one human life, and so on, and at the end of the day one’s underlying thought is as thoroughly consequentialist as can be, despite the deontological gloss. And what’s wrong with that? Nothing, except for the fact that the deontological gloss adds nothing and furthers the myth that there really are “rights,” etc. Best to drop it. When deontological talk gets sophisticated, the thought it represents is either dogmatic in an esoteric sort of way or covertly consequentialist.

### AT: Security

**Security must first be achieved before peace and ethics can be built**

Commander Stensli, Department of Comparative Politics at University of Bergen, Norway, ’03 (Hans Olav, http://www.pacem.no/2003/1/debatt/stensli/)

Rolfsen on Realism The first aspect in Rolfsen`s article that strikes me as odd is his very selective reading of political realism. As Wæver(10) shows, there is no such thing as a single “political realism” that can be treated as a Theory. Rather, Political realism should be seen as a group or class of theories, hypothesis and world views that have no more in common than a pessimistic view towards utopian notions of progress solely based on appeals to reason and values. Unfortunately, realists tell us, our first task is to secure relative peace (absence of war) and stability. Realists thus are sceptical against any thinker or politician who claims to have found a promising path towards a platform on which to build a universal approach to secure democracy, toleration, the rule of law, human rights and peace, all being the ultimate goals of both idealists and realists. But building peace is actually far more difficult than wishing it. This latter truism is a classical inspiration of political realism, since it leads the scholar into considering an ethics of responsibility and expected consequences rather than elaborate attempts at analysing universally applicable ethical norms. As mentioned, the central normative appeal in realism itself is that the survival of the polity is the precondition for thinking about foreign policy (including ethics) at all. I believe that any serious discussion of ethics in politics, and policies of security, should acknowledge this heritage of PR as a starting point of the discussion. I believe most realists would pose the following question; how can it be immoral to lay emphasis on the survival of one’s own polity? Realists will claim that, in principle, there is nothing wrong a priori, in striving to meet the most basic of all national interests; namely survival.

#### No impact — threat construction doesn’t cause war

**Kaufman 9**, Prof Poli Sci and IR – U Delaware, 200*9* (Stuart J, “Narratives and Symbols in Violent Mobilization: The Palestinian-Israeli Case,” *Security Studies* 18:3, 400 – 434)

Even when hostile narratives, group fears, and opportunity are strongly present, war occurs only if these factors are harnessed. Ethnic narratives and fears must combine to create significant ethnic hostility among mass publics. Politicians must also seize the opportunity to manipulate that hostility, evoking hostile narratives and symbols to gain or hold power by riding a wave of chauvinist mobilization. Such mobilization is often spurred by prominent events (for example, episodes of violence) that increase feelings of hostility and make chauvinist appeals seem timely. If the other group also mobilizes and if each side's felt security needs threaten the security of the other side, the result is a security dilemma spiral of rising fear, hostility, and mutual threat that results in violence. A virtue of this symbolist theory is that symbolist logic explains why ethnic peace is more common than ethnonationalist war. Even if hostile narratives, fears, and opportunity exist, severe violence usually can still be avoided if ethnic elites skillfully define group needs in moderate ways and collaborate across group lines to prevent violence: this is consociationalism.17 War is likely only if hostile narratives, fears, and opportunity spur hostile attitudes, chauvinist mobilization, and a security dilemma.

### AT: Experts

#### Reliance on experts is necessary

Turner, Graduate Research Professor and Chair of the Department of Philosophy at the University of South Florida, ‘1 (Stephen, February “What is the Problem with Experts?” Social Studies of Science, Vol 31 Issue 1, p 123-149, Sage Publications)

The answer to Fish is to treat the liberal principle of neutrality not as an absolute assertion about the nature of beliefs, but as a core rule, whose application varies historically, whose main point is to establish a means of organizing the discussion of political matters, that is to say the discussion of political decisions. We can apply this to the problem of expertise as follows: it is no surprise that, in order for there to be genuine discussion in Schmitt's sense, some things would be temporarily taken for fact, or, alternatively, some things would be left to the experts to settle. 'Politiciz­ing' everything, making everything into the subject of political decision­making (or treating it as an analogue to political decision-making), would lose the advantages of the intellectual division of labour and make reasoned persuasion impossible. Some facts need to be taken for granted in order for there to be genuine political discussion, and some of the work of establish­ing the facts is, properly, delegated to experts. Indeed, to imagine a world in which such delegation did not occur would be to imagine a simpler society, at best a society of Jeffersonian yeomen, in which everyone knew pretty much what everyone else knew that was relevant to public decision­making. To preserve the possibility of political discussion that such societies established, it is essential to delegate to experts and grant them cognitive authority. But granting them cognitive authority is not the same as grant­ing them some sort of absolute and unquestionable power over us. The fact that expertise goes through a process of legitimation also means that legitimacy may be withdrawn and the cognitive authority of experts may collapse, and this suggests something quite different than the idea that liberalism is a kind of self-contradiction, and also something much more interesting. We, the non-experts, decide whether claims to cognitive au­thority, which in political terms are requests to have their conclusions treated as neutral fact, are to be honoured. And we have, historically, changed our minds about who is 'expert', and what is to be treated as neutral fact. This is, so to speak, a 'liberal' argument about expertise. It grants that cognitive authority and the acceptance of expertise, in modern conditions, is a condition of genuine public discourse. Liberalism, in the form of the principle of neutrality, is a means to the end of the creation of the conditions for public discourse. It is a means, however, that is not given by God, or the courts, or 'reason', but lives in the political decisions we make to regard assertions as open to public discussion or not. Historically, liberalism established the space for public discussion by expelling religious sectarian 'expertise'. The challenge of the present is, in part, to deal with the claims of non-religious experts to cognitive authority. There is no formula for meeting this challenge. But there is a process of legitimation and delegitimation. And it should be no surprise that this process has come to occupy more of public discourse than ever before. But the very vigour of discussion, and the ability of the public to make decisions about what claims are legitimate, belies the image of the liberal public as victim. Is this enough? Or is there a higher standard of proper public delibera­tion to which public acceptance of expert claims ought to be held? Anti-liberals, following the arguments of Habermas and Foucault, have gen­erally said that it is not enough. For them, it is precisely the point of the critique of expertise to show how our forms of reasoning in public deliberation are preconditioned by unchallenged and, practically speaking, unchallengeable forming assumptions that derive from experts.7 The kind of social constructionism that has been practised in much of science studies is different in character, and has different implications, for it is concerned not with showing that some forms of discussion involve social construction and others do not, but with showing that even science has this character. As I have suggested, to the extent that it has been concerned with establishing the conventional and mutable character of many of the distinctions that philosophers of science have attempted to absolutize, that is to say to make scientists less immaculate and more like plumbers, social constructionism parallels a moment in liberal theory. The moment is the one at which it was recognized that the history of liberalism is a matter of 'continuation by other means', in which the 'foundations' of actual liberal democracies are conventions, custom, flexibly applied and typically somewhat vague 'principles' rather than rigid doctrines or acts of faith. A corollary recognition to this political realization is that despite being mutable and shifting, conventions have sufficed to preserve what Schmitt ([1926] 1985: 5) characterized as the real possibility of'persuad­ing one's opponents through argument of the truth or justice of something, or allowing oneself to be persuaded of something as true or just'. The parallel claim that what counts as 'expert' is conventional, muta­ble and shifting, and that people are persuaded of claims to expertise through mutable, shifting conventions does not make the decisions to accept or reject the authority of experts less than reasonable in the sense appropriate to liberal discussion. To grant a role to expert knowledge does not require us to accept the immaculate conception of expertise. The lesson of the second kind of social constructionism is that these conditions, the conditions of mutability - and not some sort of analogue to Haber-mas's ideal-speech situation - are the conditions under which scientific consensus itself occurs, and that there is no alternative. This is a negative message, but nevertheless an important one, in that it excludes a certain kind of utopianism about expertise and its 'control' by some sort of higher reason. Excluding this kind of utopianism is a kind of answer to the issues with which we began. Expertise is a deep problem for liberal theory only if we imagine that there is some sort of standard of higher reason against which the banal process of judging experts as plumbers can be held, and if there is not, it is a deep problem for democratic theory only if this banal process is beyond the capacity of ordinary people.

#### Alternatives to expert-driven evidence qualifications are equally dangerous

Solt, ‘4 (Roger, Debate Coach – U. Kentucky, “Debate’s Culture of Narcissism”, Contemporary Argumentation and Debate, p. 58)

Kritik debaters often indict “experts” because of their narrowly focused specialization. But radical critics are the ultimate debate specialists. They acquire extreme expertise in the execution of certain themes and forms of argument. As a results, they generally fail to engage with the broader issues that more mainstream debaters commonly encounter. Radical kritik is sometimes strong on persuasion and conviction, but it is all too often short on critical thinking and especially self-criticism. Reliance on experts obviously has its dangers, though it is difficult to avoid in a complex world in which the experts usually know a lot more about a given subject than one does oneself. (This is, of course, the ultimate rationale for the employment of experts, whether they are doctors, lawyers, auto mechanics, scholars, or debate coaches.) But reliance on personal experience is also no panacea. One’s personal experience may not be representative. It is also filtered through the opaque glass of all of our own prejudices and preconceptions, most of which we acquire from our close social associates. And personal experience is subject to interpretation and reinterpretation. A given “experience” can have many interpretations, all partial, all selective, some paranoid. A salutary skepticism towards the experts should be accompanied by an equally important skepticism with regards to our own infallibility.

### AT: Terror Talk

**Changing representational practices won’t alter policy—looking to structures and politics is more vital**

Tuathail, Professor of Geography at Virginia Polytechnic Institute, 96 (Gearoid, Political Geography, Vol 15 No 6-7, p. 664, Science Direct)

While theoretical debates at academic conferences are important to academics, the discourse and concerns of foreign-policy decision- makers are quite different, so different that they constitute a distinctive problem- solving, theory-averse, policy-making subculture. There is a danger that academics assume that the discourses they engage are more significant in the practice of foreign policy and the exercise of power than they really are. This is not, however, to minimize the obvious importance of academia as a general institutional structure among many that sustain certain epistemic communities in particular states. In general, I do not disagree with Dalby’s fourth point about politics and discourse except to note that his statement-‘Precisely because reality could be represented in particular ways political decisions could be taken, troops and material moved and war fought’-evades the important question of agency that I noted in my review essay. The assumption that it is representations that make action possible is inadequate by itself. Political, military and economic structures, institutions, discursive networks and leadership are all crucial in explaining social action and should be theorized together with representational practices. Both here and earlier, Dalby’s reasoning inclines towards a form of idealism. In response to Dalby’s fifth point (with its three subpoints), it is worth noting, first, that his book is about the CPD, not the Reagan administration. He analyzes certain CPD discourses, root the geographical reasoning practices of the Reagan administration nor its public-policy reasoning on national security. Dalby’s book is narrowly textual; the general contextuality of the Reagan administration is not dealt with. Second, let me simply note that I find that the distinction between critical theorists and post- structuralists is a little too rigidly and heroically drawn by Dalby and others. Third, Dalby’s interpretation of the reconceptualization of national security in Moscow as heavily influenced by dissident peace researchers in Europe is highly idealist, an interpretation that ignores the structural and ideological crises facing the Soviet elite at that time. Gorbachev’s reforms and his new security discourse were also strongly self- interested, an ultimately futile attempt to save the Communist Party and a discredited regime of power from disintegration. The issues raised by Simon Dalby in his comment are important ones for all those interested in the practice of critical geopolitics. While I agree with Dalby that questions of discourse are extremely important ones for political geographers to engage, there is a danger of fetishizing this concern with discourse so that we neglect the institutional and the sociological, the materialist and the cultural, the political and the geographical contexts within which particular discursive strategies become significant. Critical geopolitics, in other words, should not be a prisoner of the sweeping ahistorical cant that sometimes accompanies ‘poststructuralism nor convenient reading strategies like the identity politics narrative; it needs to always be open to the patterned mess that is human history.